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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
During the first half of this decade, the United States defense 
budget has doubled in current dollar figures or increased by 52% in con-
stant 1985 dollar values <Collins, 1985>. Currently the U.S . Department 
of Defense budget ranks second based on size and accounts for over 25% 
of the discretionary Federal budget. This is equivalent to approximately 
7% of Gross Domestic Product <GDP>, or nearly $350 billion. 
Membership in an alliance, such as NATO, may ease the defense budget 
burden since other members also contribute to the all i ance-wide benefits. 
Among the European NATO allies, an average member contributes 3 . 8% of 
GDP to military expenditures. However , alliance provision of defense 
benefits is not efficient; Iceland has no defense budget while Turkey 
reports over 7% of GDP for defense . For this reason, it is of interest 
to study the alliance defense e xpenditures and the factors which influence 
the level an ally chooses to spend. 
The theory and empirical analysis in defense economics is not new. 
In 1966, Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhauser introduced the public goods 
approach for studying military alliances. Statistical analysis supports 
Olson and Zeckhauser's hypothesis that the large, wealthy allies carry 
a larger portion of the defense burden, allowing the s mall allies to 
enjoy a free ride . 
A series of interesting papers examine the Israeli - U.S. alliance 
<McGuire, 1982>, modern day alliances <Murdoch and Sandler, 1982, 1984, 
1986), international defense comparisons <Dudley and Montmarquette, 1981> 
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and trade in alliances (Jones , 1988). Int r oduction of the joint products 
theory u llows defense expenditures to produce public, private and impure 
public outputs based upon the mi x of conventional and strateg ic weapons 
<Sandler and Cauley, 1975; Sandler, 1977; Murdoch and Sandler, 1982>. 
Along with the more advanced theory are more sophisticated statistical 
testing procedures. 
Although there have been attempts to test the joint products hypoth-
esis for the NATO alliance, these e xe rcises relied on i mperfec t pro xies 
to differentiate between strategic and nonstrategic mil i tary acti vity . 
Hy thesis will carefully develop a strategi c time series t o use in testing 
the joint products theory. Using data for each of the nuc lear al lies 
and seven of the nonnuclear all i es, I will r egress each all y 's military 
expenditure against conventional spillins <all other all iance members' 
conventional e xpenditures >, strategic spi lli ns , and Gross Domest ic Prod-
uct. 
By clarifying the r esponsiveness of al li ance members' defense e x-
penditures, economists have the tools to anal yze the impact of changes 
in policy, defense technology, or the level of an all y ' s defense e xpendi -
ture. 
Li terature Review 
In their seminal article, "An Econom ic Theory of All ianc~s." Olson 
and Zeckhauser ( 1966 ) use public goods theory to analyze alliance be-
havior. Finding that the larger countries within NATO bear a greater 
portion of the defense burden, Olson and Zeckhauser suggest that such 
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behavior is a result of the inequality between an all y's marginal cost 
share of defense and the marginal benefits of the alliance defense. 
Another observation is that larger countries place a higher value on 
defense, since in th~ event of an adversary attack , the larger countries 
have more to lose. Empirical evidence supports this with a significant 
positive correlation between an ally's national income and that all y's 
percentage of national income for defense. 
Jacques van Ypersele de Strihou (1967> determines an ally's burden 
share as the difference between defense e xpenditures and benefits. De-
fense expenditures include both military costs and foreign aid programs 
since both provide external security. Strictly national benefits such 
as internal security, research and development, economic benefits, and 
political benefits are the private benefits of defense, whereas external 
security is the public defense benefit. These establish the joint prod-
ucts of a country's defense budget. National benefits are deduc ted from 
a country's defense expenditure to obtain the net contribution to the 
public good . This difference is the measure of the ''burden" for a count r y 
in the provision of the international common good. Although Van Ypersele 
de Strihou finds that the larger countries do support a larger burden, 
when incl udi ng conscripts and foreign aid in costs, he concludes that 
the shortcomings of the small countries are not great in dollar terms . 
Contributions to the literature by Sand ler <1977 ) , Sandler and Loehr 
<1978>, and Sandler, Cauley and Forbes <1980) provide a taxonomy of de-
fense goods . By distinguishing among deterrent weapons, protective wea-
pons, and mixed weapons these authors develop a joint products model. 
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The joint products model allows for public, private, and impure 
public output from defense expenditures . To extend Olson and Zeckhausers ' 
disproportionate burden sharing results, application of impure public 
goods theory and the joint products model reveals that the greater the 
proportion of deterrent defense an ally provides, the greater will be 
the disproportionate burden sharing . Alliance members in this case do 
not equate the marginal benefits of alliance defense to their marginal 
cost <contribution). This is the cause of free riding among the NATO 
alli es. 
Empirical studies by Sandler and Forbes <1980) and Murdoch and 
Sandler <1982, 1984) measure the responsiveness of an ally's defense 
expenditures to the level of defense provided by all other allies . The 
sta ti s tical tests of the data support the notion of free riding behavior. 
As other alliance members increase total provision of defense, an indi-
vidual member has an incentive to reduce military expenditures . This 
is particularly prevalent among the European alliance members and Canada. 
Murdoch and Sandler (1984) track the effect of the NATO strategy 
shift from Mutual Assured Destruction <MADl to the doctrine of Flex ible 
Response. Once NATO adopts the flexible response strategy (which calls 
for a conventional and tactical nuclear weapon exchange rather than an 
all-out nuclear confrontation), European countries no longer rel y as 
strongly on the deterrent defense within NATO . Rather, their own con-
ventional forces are necessary to complement the strategic forces . To 
capture the response to this strategy shift, Murdoch and Sandler ( 1984) 
include a dummy variable in the joint products military e xpenditure model. 
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The empirical results support the hypothesis that the doctrine of Flexible 
Response induces complementarity between nuclear and nonnuclear forces 
and reduces the free riding behavior. The same statistical test suggests 
that the United States begins to substitute other NATO members' military 
expenditures for the ir own as a result of the strategy shift. 
A similar joint products military expenditure model for the Aus-
tralian, New Zealand, U.S. alliance <ANZUSl enables Murdoch and Sandler 
(1985 ) to analyze the level of free riding and other factors which in-
fluence military e xpendi tures for these countries. This model yi elds 
interesting results not found in the NATO alliance, primarily that it 
is feasible for members in the alliance to be e xcluded from the deterrent 
umbrella, therefore free riding behavior is not as extensive. 
Sweden, Switzerland, and Finland, are neutral countries, yet due 
to geographical proximity may receive defense benefits from other sur -
rounding countries or the NATO alliance. Murdoch and Sandler ( 1986 1 
modify ~he joint products model for military expenditure to take into 
account nonalliance spillin benefits. The authors discuss the e xtent 
of free riding or neutrality for each Scandinavian country by anal yzing 
the coefficients of the spillin terms. Murdoch and Sandler find that 
Switzerland and Finland do not free ride on NATO defense e xpenditures. 
After the doctrine of Flexible Response, Sweden relies on NATO 's and 
other countries' conventional forces to a small extent. Denmark a nd 
Norway have s i milar responses to the NATO spillins. Other interesting 
results from their study reveal that Finland and Denmark respond in a 
similar manner to an increase in their own real GDP. Likewise, Norway 
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and Sweden share a similar type of response to their own GDP increase 
in determining the level of defense expenditures. 
Prados, Wit, and Zagurek (1986 > d i scuss plans for upgrading the 
British and French nuclear forces . The nuclear force increases proposed 
for the next decade will change the dynamics of strategic arms negotia-
tions and have implications within the NATO alliance. According to these 
authors, by 1990 France will have the capability of destroy ing two- thirds 
of the Soviet production base and killing 81 million Sov iet citi zens. 
The French are aiming their possible attac k at the ad versary' s admin i s-
trati ve, economic, and social structure. The British , on the other hand, 
are target i ng Soviet urban and industrial centers. The British strategic 
capability estimates for the 1990s project 24-68 million fatalities and 
up to half the production capabilities of the Soviet Union. 
This level of strategic power will not be ignored by the Sov iet 
Union. Even prior to the intensi ve strategic build-up , ther e has been 
a Soviet recommendation to tie U.S. strategic negotiations to l imi t the 
other nuclear NATO members' forces. In the future, these countr i es ma y 
choose to negotiate separately from the United States. Tne shift of 
strategic dominance away from the United States within NATO may have 
other implications as well. 
Sandler <1988> adds to the literature the possible impact that a 
counterdeterrent force suc h as SDI might have on burden sharing with i n 
the NATO alliance. Depending on the technology <whether missiles are 
destroyed during the boost phase or during the reentry phase > t he e xtent 
of free riding wi ll vary. If the SDI is a pure public good it will 
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eliminate the missile prior to the target destination being kno wn. This 
will induce free riding behavior on the SOI program. If the technology 
is capable of eliminating the missile once the target is determined, 
then the defense technology is private. Being able to e xclude alliance 
members from the defense will induce each ally to contribute pr oportion-
ately for the benefits. Sandler 's article also discusses the implicati ons 
of the U.S.-Soviet nuclear disarmament proposal for European-based mis-
siles . If an agreement is r eached, the European countries will have 
less free riding ability . Sandler suggests this will create a greater 
need for those countries to increase the i r own conventional forces, 
thereby redistributing the NATO defense burden more equitabl y . Sandler 
conc ludes that the burden sharing within the NATO a l l i ance wi l l depend 
upon advancements in technology, the strategi c capabilities of other 
alliance members and the outcome of U.S. - Soviet strategic negotiati ons . 
Sandler ( 1987 ) uses a joint products military e xpenditure model 
to anal yz e an alliance policy for a fixed rate of mi l itary e xpenditure 
increase . Cross sectional and time s er i es data provide empiri cal results 
showing that an all y bases the ir mi l itary e xpenditure on a var iety of 
factors. Both external spillin benefits from the alliance and an al li ance 
policy c hange infl uence a country's defense e xpenditures . Economic fac-
tors also play an important role in resource allocation to defense . 
Trends such as free riding, complementarity between conventional and 
strategic forces, and substitution poss i bilit i es for the nuc lear allies 
are also supported by Sandler's empirical resu l ts . 
Sandler ' s application of the jo int products model to all i ance defense 
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provides a way to predict an ally's military contribution capabilities 
and allows for comment on alliance policy . Sandler concludes that a 
fixed percentage increase in real military e xpenditures is not a feasible 
plan since there are many other factors to consider in determining defense 
expenditures. Sandler also uses different GDP growth scenarios and vary-
ing spillin levels to calculate the possible defense expenditure changes 
for France, Britain, and the Federal Republic of Germany. 
Reference Sources 
The following reference books provide useful information f or analyz-
ing U.S. defense expenditures. I obtained detailed data and /or bac kground 
information necessary for calculating the U. S. strategic time series 
from these sources. 
Budget of the United States: Appendix provi des line item appropriations , 
budget authority, or obligations for the various agencies , departments 
and branches of the government. 
Budget of the United States: Historical Tables has useful tables showing 
government expenditures over extended periods of time. It provides a 
quick review of military expenditure percentages and shows trends in 
military size. 
Department of Defense Annual Report provides the Secretary of Defense's 
annual message to Congress. This report includes detailed information 
for all branches of the military . 
Jane's Yearbooks provides a complete listing of weaponr y for each countr v . 
This is useful in determining whether a weapon belongs in the s trategic 
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or conventional calculation. 
Scope of Thesis 
To both complement and extend the previous studies in alliance de-
fense, this thesis will focus on the responsiveness of NATO members to 
conventional spillins and strategic spillins. The data are 1970-1985 
military expenditures for Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France , the Federal 
Republic of Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom and 
the United States. Throughout this period, NATO was operating under 
the doctrine of Flexible Response , so, unlike previous work by Murdoch 
and Sandler <1984>, it is not necessary to include a strategy shift vari-
able in the models. The Reagan administration ' s renewed defense emphasis 
is captured by using a dummy variable after 1981 . 
A priori the best proxy for strategic spillins is unknown. For 
this reason, I will estimate the joint products defense model us ing three 
slightly different methods for calculating the strategic spillin pro xy . 
One proxy will be the sum of British, French, and U.S. strategic procure-
ment since this is the most visile form of strategic e xpenditures. The 
United States has been the dominant strategic member in NATO; therefore 
allies may respond only to strategic spillins from the U.S. A proxy 
for the U.S. will be calculated first as the total strategic budget. 
Again, since procurement is the most visable form of strategic e xpendi -
ture, I will also calculate a pro xy for U.S . strategic procurement. 
In addition, for the three nuclear members <France, the United King-
dom, and the United States) I measure the responsiveness of conventional 
10 
expenditures to spillins and the responsiveness of strategic expenditures 
to spillins. From these results, I observe whether the nuclear alliance 
members have different responses for conventional and strategic expendi-
tures. 
The remainder of the thesis is divided into four chapters. Chap-
ter II provides background terminology and definitions. The joint prod-
ucts theory is developed for a representative nonnuclear ally as well 
as for a representative nuclear ally. The notions of substitutes and 
complements among defense expenditures are also discussed. Chapter III 
examines the procedure to calculate the strategic data sets for the United 
States, the United Kingdom and France, as well as the statistical models 
and definitions of the variables. Chapter IV presents the empirical 
results. A short summary of major conclusions from the thesis is found 
in Chapter V. 
11 
CHAPTER II. THEORETICAL MODELS 
Nonnuclear All ies 
The NATO alliance now consists of sixteen allies, three of which 
possess nuclear strategic weapons in their arsenals . The nuclear allies 
include the United States, Britain, and France, while the nonnuclear 
allies include Iceland , Luxembourg, Belgium, the Netherlands, Canada, 
Denmark, Norway, Italy , Greece, Turkey, Portugal, Wes t Germany, and Spai n . 
To capture the differences between the behavior of the nuclear and non-
nuclear allies, it is necessary to disti ngu ish the utilit y-maximizing 
behavior for the representative nuclear and nonnuclear all y in an n-
country alliance like that of NATO. Following the convention of previous 
work <Murdoch and Sandler, 1982, 1984, 1986 >, I employ a joint product 
model of alliance behavior in which an ally's arsenal is characterized 
as providing multiple outputs of var ying degrees of publicness <Sandler 
and Cauley, 1975; Murdoch and Sandler, 1982, 1984, 1986; Sandler, 1977 : 
Sandler and Forbes, 1980). 
The arsenal of a nonnuclear ally yie lds at least two kinds of bene-
f its: damage-limiting protection in the event of a convent i onal attac k 
and private defense benefits to the ally. These pri vate defense benefits 
include, among others, protection of coastal waters <if the country is 
not landlocked >, relief in times of national disaster, and control of 
domestic terrorists . Such private defense benefits are private between 
allies, but yi eld nonri va l and nonexcludable or public benefits within 
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the nation. 1 Although multiple private benefits are typicall y deri ved 
from an alliance's arsenal, for simplicity, it is assumed that only one 
private benefit exists. No generality is lost with this assumption, 
since the model ' s va riab les can be interpreted easily as vectors of bene-
fits. In addition to the private benefit, a conventional-arms arsenal 
yields damage-limiting protection, used to deter an enemy and to impede 
an enemy' s attack during war <Sandler , 1977; Sandler and Forbes, 1980> . 
Most damaging-l i miting protection benefits are partia l l y rival owing 
to a thinning of forces as the fixed-sized arsenal is spread along a 
longer perimeter.e Moreover, a portion of these protecti ve benefits 
is e xcludable , since the providing country can deploy its forces e lse-
where. There are, however, deterrent aspects of a conventional arsenal 
that surely y ield some pure public benefits to the allies. 
Consider a representati ve , but not necessaril y identical, nonnuclear 
ally that must allocate its scarce resources between a militar y activi t y , 
q, and a private consumption acti v ity, y . A un i t of the private non-
defense activity yi elds a unit of the private good, a l so denoted by y, 
while a unit of the conventional military activity yiel ds both a private 
~A pure public good is totall y nonri val in consumpt ion, since its 
consumption by one individual <nation ) does not detrac t in the slightest 
from the consumption opportunities available to other persons <na tions) . 
Moreover, the benefits of a pure public good are nonexc ludable; once 
it is provided, the good is available to all. In contras t, a private 
good (e .g. , a drink of water > is totall y rival and it s benefits are e x-
cludable. Impure public goods (benefit s) exhibit varying degrees of 
ri valry . 
2 In a more complicated model, thinn i ng effects could be handl ed 
by including the number of allies as a choice var iable as in Murdoch 
and Sandler <1982). 
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and an impure public defense output. Let x stand for the private defense 
output and z for the impure defense output of damage-limiting protection. 
The joint product relationships are 
x = f (q ) (2. 1] 
and 
z=gCq l , [2.2) 
where o x/o q = f ' > 0 and o z /o q = g ' > 0, and where both f Cq l and gCq l 
are strictly concave, twice-continuously differentiable functions. In 
equations 2.1 and 2.2, f ' and g ' measure the respective marginal produc-
tivities of the military activity in providing private outputs and dam-
age-limitation benefits . 
In an alliance, an ally may obtain benefits in terms of conventiona l-
war deterrence and damage limitation from other allies ' conventional 
expenditure activity. Along the central front in the Rhine Valley, for 
example, arms and soldiers from various NATO allies are deployed to deter -Warsaw Pact aggression. The amount of conventional-based benefits, Z, 
that are provided by the other allies is a function of the aggregate 
IV 
conventional military activity, Q, in the other allies, including both 
the nuclear and nonnuclear allies -- i.e., 
,,..,. IV 
Z=h<Ql, (2 . 3) 
;V 
where h ' > 0 and h" < O, and Q is all other allies ' conventional military 
activities. The total level of conventional-based benefits, z, can be 
simply represented as 
IV z = z + z. [2.4) 
Clearly, a weighting scheme could be applied to aggregating conventiona l 
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benefits across allies; but such a scheme, while complicating the presen-
tation, would not alter the reduced-form equations for the demand for 
military e xpenditures, wh ich I seek to derive and e stimate . Some impurity 
aspects can be captured by the f( · l and h( · J functions . 
Each ally, nonnuclear or otherwise , also derives a pure l y public 
benef it from the deterrence y ielded by strategic activities (e . g . , e x-
penditure on Trident Submarines> of the so-call ed nucl ear a l lies. The 
aggregate strategic deterrence f or the all iance is notated as S, which 
i s the s um of the strategic deterrent activiti es in the nuclear allies. 
As a pure public benefit, S enter s each all y 's utility function . 
This provides the arguments for t he stylized utility-optimizing 
problem 3 for a representative nonnucl ear ally . The preferences of a 
representative all y are depicted by a well-behaved, strictl y conc ave, 
nonsatiable t wi ce-continuously differentiable utility function : 
U = U<y , x, Z , SJ [2.5) 
Using equations 2.1 to 2 . 4 to substitute for x and Z, the utility func tion 
c an be expressed in terms of activity space: 
,.,, 
U = U< y , q, Q, SJ. [2.6) 
By formulating the model in acti vity space, it facilitates the empirical 
anal ysis since military acti vity can be pro xi ed by military expe nditures. 
To deri ve a nonnucl ear all y ' s demand equation for militar y activities , 
3For purposes here , the uti l ity function be longs to a decision-making 
oli garc hy i n the respective country . The problem can be respecified 
to appl y to other agents. See the discussi on concerning decision makers 
in Oppenheime r <1979 J, McGu ire and Groth <1985 >, and Sandler, Cau ley, 
and Forbes ( 1980). 
15 
the utility function in equation 2.6 is maximized subject to the constancy 
of conventional and strategic spillovers 
and to the budget constraint: 
I = y ~ p q, 
c 
,.,, 
i.e., Q and S constant --
[2.7J 
where I is the nation's income, p is the per-unit cost of conventional 
c 
military acti vi t y, and unity is the per-unit cost of the pri vate act ivi t y . 
"" The constancy of Q implies Nash-Cournot behavior, whereb y an all y con-
siders all possible conventional acti v ity levels of the other allies 
when choosing its own level of conventiona l e xpendi ture . In part icu l a r , 
the ally picks its maximizing level of military activity based upon the 
,.,, 
best choice for Q of the other allies <McGuire and Groth , 1985; Sa ndler 
and Murdoch, 1988 ) . 
The demand for military e xpenditures is found in two s teps. First, 
I derive the first-order conditions associated with optimizing utility 
sub j ect to the relevant constraints. This is accomp lished by differenti-
ating with respect to y , q, and the Lagrangian mult ipli e r, associated 
with the budget constraint. The first-order conditions y ield three equa-
tions in which our choice var i ables -- y and q -- are imp l icitl y defined 
~ 
i n terms of the parameters -- I, p , Q, and S. Second, I invoke 
c . 
the implicit function theorem to express choice variables as expli cit 
functions. In particular, a nonnuclear ally's demand for mi l it ary ac -
tivi t y is 
IV 
q = q <p , I, Q, 5) 
c 
[2 .8J 
In Chapter IV, equation 2.8 is est i mated for a sample of no nnuclear NATO 
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all i es . The follow ing partial derivatives of this equat ion prove im-
"' portant: oq / o l, 0q/oQ, and oqloS. The first measures the eff ec t of a n 
i nc ome (i .e., Gross Domestic Product) change on a nonnuclear al ly's demand 
for militar y activity, the second denotes the effect of other allies ' 
conventional expenditures <or spil l insl on a nonnuclear all y' s mi l itary 
demand, and the third depicts the effect of strategic e xpend itures or 
sp i ll ins on a nonnuclear all y' s militar y demand. Income no r mality is 
i mplied by a positive oq / o I and is expected to hol d for a ll allies. 
~ 
The s ign of ~/~Q depends on the consumption relationship of the jointl y 
produced defense outputs and on income effects (see Murdoch and Sandler 
11984 ) for detailsl . If the t wo defense activities are substitutes <i . e ., 
~ 
they fulfill similar purposes ) , t hen there is a tendenc y for c q / oQ to 
be negative . The tendency is stronger, the smaller i s the associat ed 
i ncome effect, which for normal goods i s in the op pos i t e direction to 
the subs titution effect. In the case of complements <i . e . , a case where 
two defense outputs enhance one another's marginal bene fits >, the tendenc y 
;.,; 
i s for cq /oQ to be positi ve, but near zero. For nonnuclea r a llies, the 
degree of subs t itutabili ty between t he a l l i es ' conve ntional f orces is. 
indeed , ver y limited owing to t hinning - - a tank on the border of Franc e 
is not going to substitute grea tly for a tank on the northern border 
of Norwa y . With the doctr ine of f lexi ble response, each al ly must main-
tain strong conventional forces if the all y wants to keep its soil from 
bec oming the initial batt l ef ield for a conventional e xchange <Murdoch 
and Sandler <1984, pp. 90-91 ) . Thus, increases in the other allies ' 
conventional expenditures are not e xpected to elicit a subst i tuti on 
17 
l'V 
reaction; for normal goods, the sign of cSq/oQ is expected to be positive. 
In fact, an increase in the other allies' conventional e xpenditures should 
i nduce the nonnuclear all y to spend more on conventional armaments so 
that it does not appear wea k to the opposition. This predicted reaction 
is in opposition to free riding, whereb y an ally relies on another for 
its defense. 
The sign of oq/oS also depends on the consumption relationship of 
conventional and strategic expenditures. A complementar y relationship 
is consistent with a positive sign, while a substitution re lationship 
is consistent with a smaller positive value or negative value, depending 
upon the income effect. 
Before I turn to the nuclear allies, there is an interpretation 
of the first-order conditions that is worth presenting. Ma xi mizing the 
utility function subject to equations 2.1-2.4 and 2 .7 yields the following 
requirement from the nonnuclear ally ' s viewpoint : 
f'MRS + g'MRS = pc' 
xy zy 
(2.9] 
where MRS is the marginal rate of substitution of good x for good y, xy 
and MRS is the marginal rate of substitut ion of good z for good y . 
zy 
The left-hand side of equation 2.9 is the marginal benefit deri ved by 
the ally from a unit of conventional expenditure. Since each unit of 
q yields units of private and damage- limiting benefits, the marginal 
value of each must be accounted for and weighted by the respective mar-
ginal productivities. The right-hand side of equation 2.9 is the marginal 
cost of a unit of q. 
18 
Nuclear A 11 i es 
Unlike t~e nonnuclear allies, the nuclear all y must allocate defense 
e xpenditures to both conventional and strategic armaments. As b~fore, 
convent ional defense activity, q, yi elds joi nt products: a private de-
fense output, x, and an i mpure public output, z, of damage-limiting pro-
tection. Thus, the nuclear allies also abide by equations 2 . 1 and 2 . 2 . 
Moreover, the spillin of conventiona l defense from the other allies sat1s-
IV N 
fies equation 2.3, where Z = h (Q). Total damage-limitation benefits 
....... 
is the sum of z and Z. In keeping with the literature <see, e:g·, Olson 
and Zeckhauser, 1966), deterrence benefits, derived from strategi c weapons 
expenditure, are treated as a ~ure public good . 
Strategic acti vities, unlike conventional acti vities, are assumed 
only to give off a single output of deterrence, obtained from the threat 
of reta li a tion . Le t s denote the representati ve nuclear all y' s provi sion 
,y 
of the strategic activit y, and let S depict the provision of the strategic 
acti vity by the other nuclear allies. Without sacrificing generality, 
it can be assumed that each un it of strateg ic activity yi elds a unit 
of deterrence, which we also denote bys. Thus, total strategic benefits, 
S, are 
,..,,, 
s = s + s . 
The nuclear ally's well-behaved utility function is 
,.., 
U = U<y, x, Z, s + S>, 
(2 .1 0) 
(2.11) 
which c a n be expressed, once again, in terms of acti v ity space: 
~ N 
U = U<y, q, Q, s + S>. (2 .1 2) 
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To derive a nuclear all y' s demand equations for conventional and strategic 
defense acti vi ties, the utility function in equation 2.12 is ma ximiz ed 
subject to the constancy of conventional and str ategic spillovers 
,..,, -i . e., Q and S constant -- and to the budget constraint : 
= y + p Q + p s, (2.13) 
c s 
where p is per-unit cost of strategic activities. The nuclear ally's 
s 
problem differs from that of the nonnuclear ally owing to the additional 
choice variable of strategic expenditure. When utility is maximized 
subject to the relevant constraints, four first-order conditions are 
deri ved that implicitly define the all y's demands for y, q, ands in 
terms of the parameters. These latter two demand equations are 
"' -q = q(p ' PS' I' Q, .Sl c (2.14) 
,.., 
""" s = s<p ' p s' I ' Q, S>. c (2.15] 
Total military activity demand , ME, would then equal 
ME = pc q < · > + p s s < · ) , [ 2 • 16 J 
where the arguments have been suppressed. In Chapter IV, equations 2.14 
and 2 .1 5 can be estimated individually or else can be estimated as 
equation 2.16; the overall results will be unchanged when the for mer 
two equations are linear. Even so, estimating the individual demands 
for strategic and conventional e xpend itures can provide additi ona l 
insights. The following partial deri vatives of ME prove of interest 
,..,. ,..., 
in Chapter IV: oME /o I , oME/oQ, and oME /oS. The first measures the 
influence of income changes on the nuclear ~lly's total military 
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expenditures and is expected to be positive, while the second denotes 
the influence of changes in conventional spillins on the ally's military 
expenditures and, by the previous discussion, is predicted to be positive. 
l'V 
The third partial, oME/oS, indicates the effect of changes in strategic 
spillins on militar y expenditures . There is a greater possibility for 
substitution, especiall y between the strategic arsenals of the nuclear 
IV 
allies Ci.e., os/oS < 0 in equation 2.15>, when strategic spillins are 
considered owing to the pure publicness of these spillins. A British-
deployed Trident II missile possesses the same threat of retaliation 
as that of a U.S.-deployed missile. Each of the three nuclear allies 
deploys its nuclear arsenal to be within striking distance of the Warsaw 
Pact . Unlike conventional forces, thinning does not characterize these 
strategic weapons. 
The first - order conditions associated with the nuclear ally's 
utility-maximizing problem also provide the requirement for deciding 
the division between strategic and conventional expenditures: 
MRS = 
_2Y. 
p 
s 
f'MRS + g'MRS 
xy zy 
p 
c 
[2.17] 
where MRS is the marginal rate of substitution between strategic output sy 
and the private numeraire good. The right-hand side of equation 2.17 
is the marginal benefit per dollar derived from strategic acti v it ies , 
while the left-hand side is the marginal benefit per dollar deri ved from 
conventional activities. The terms on the right account fo r the jointl y 
produced outputs. 
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CHAPTER III. PROCEDURES 
Strategic Data Sets 
U.S. mili t ary e xpenditure data are easil y accessible, but the stra-
tegic component of these data are not consistent or complete. For this 
reason, it is necessary to develop an accurate strategic data set . The 
Budget of the United States Government: Appendix appears to be the most 
reliable source for detailed information . Since free or easy riding 
depends on the anticipated contributions of the other allies, w i 11 
make use of the line item appropr i at ions fo r defense. The true strategic 
calculation includes both the strategic force line items and add itional 
"bur i ed appropriations'' such as training, central supply and maintenance, 
support equipment, administration , etc . Descriptions of the budget line 
items provide additional information to determine whether to include 
the line item with strategic or conventional appropriations. 
Each branch of the military <ar my, navy, ai r for ce , and marine corps l 
has three categories necessary for calculating strategic appropriations. 
These categories are personnel, operation and maintenance <O&Ml. and 
procurement. Also included in the strategic calcul ation are the relevant 
line items from the military research, development, test and evaluation 
<RDT&E> category, the Department of Energy, and the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration <NASA >. 
The army, navy, air force, and mar i ne corps use identical line items 
from the personnel category; therefore, the same ~rocedure applies to 
each branch. The personnel subtotal consists of the fol low ing line items : 
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1) strategic forces, 2> research and development, 3 ) central suppl y and 
maintenance, 4) training, and 5) administration. A s t rategic percentage 
is found by dividing expenditures on strategic forces by e xpenditures 
on total forces Ci . e., general purpose forces plus strategic forces ) . 
This percentage is appl ied to line items 2, 3, 4 and 5. The sum of these 
four figures added to line item l provides the branch personnel subtotal s . 
By s umm ing the four military branches' personnel subtotal, I ~btain the 
strategic personnel expenditure. The 1970-1981 data for strategic per-
sonnel are i n Tab le 1. 
In 1982, the li~e item descriptions for the personnel c ategory c ha nge 
and it is no longer possib le · to separate out strategic personne l fr om 
total personnel . Since strategic personnel data are a va i lable for 1970-
1981, it is possible to make fairl y reliable point f or ecasts for 1982-
1985. A detailed explanation of the second-order autoregress i on for ecast 
procedure is in Appendix 8. The forecast model appear s to be correctl y 
specified and the point estimates are intuitivel y ap peal ing . Forecast 
personnel data for 1982-1985 are in Table 1. 
The operations and maintenance <O&Ml category a l s o has i den t i ca l 
line items for each branch. Each branch's O&M s ubto tal cons i s t s of the 
following line items: 1) strategic for ces, 2 > cent r al supp l y a nd main-
tenance, 3 ) tra i ning , and 4 ) administrat i on. Again, a st r a t egic per-
centage i s found by di v iding e xpenditures fo r s trateg i c f orces by t he 
e xpenditures for total forces. Thi s percentage is ap p lied to l i ne items 
2 , 3, and 4. The s um of these three f i gures p lus line i tem y i e l ds 
each branch's O&M subtotal . By s umming the army , navy , a ir f orce , and 
Table 1: 1970-1985 U. S . Strategic Appropriations by Category 
<All figures in thousands of current dollars > 
Year . Personne l 0 g, M Procurement 
1970 2,684,879.568 3 ,493 ,280 . 115 2,649,852 . 724 
197 1 2,621 , 137 . 861 3,422,407 . 498 2,423,901.902 
1972 2,875,194. 290 3,716,495.700 2,820,947.224 
1973 3' 151 '289 . 035 4,155,472 . 793 2,802,454 . 368 
1974 3,420,729 . 748 4,266,133.621 2,485,432.467 
1975 3,364,852 . 173 4,669,216 . 474 3,012,722.440 
1976 3 I 34 7 I 290 • 164 4,965,323.663 2,313,583.045 
1977 3,174,075.573 5, 232,725.262 3,496,368 . 684 
1978 3 ' l 91 ' 058 . 773 5,223,661 . 123 4, 123,441.256 
1979 3,262,837 . 954 5,757,770 . 395 1,620,730 . 209 
1980 3,422,549.351 6,763,552.216 2,520, 146 . 776 
1981 4 '006 '807 . 33\ 8,090,231.245 2 . 853' 229 . 43-f a 
1982 4 I 316 I 982 • 50 cf 8,830,188.225 2 I 144 t 0 l 1 , 791 
1983 5,373,445.34~ 9,377,437.945 6 ' 733 ' 41 9 . 39-f 
1984 5,972,843.99 9 , 851 , 723 . 378 12 ' 722 . 852 . 728'3 
10 , 783 ,350.480 
a 
1985 8,651, 140.824 13,385,905.516 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
a 
Includes 8- 18 bomber appropriations. 
b 
Forecast value from AR<2 > procedure. 
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RDT&E Energy NASA 
1 ' 955 ' 395 . 1 98 1,456,925 . 085 0. 000 
1 , 595 ,398 . 386 1,450,596 . 537 0 . 000 
1,488,808 . 989 1 , 457,527 .609 102 , 975 . 000 
1,579,495 . 154 1,408, 774 . 355 82,260.000 
l , 8 14,500 . 633 1 '531 '539 . 291 0 . 000 
1, 775,825.456 l ,709,370.000 0 . 000 
l '931 ' 144 . 487 1 ,695,999. 158 0 . 000 
2 , 945,7 17 . 761 2,086,727 . 246 0 . 000 
3,1 62 , 735 . 942 2, 173,909 . 500 0 . 000 
2,652 , 807 . 987 2,33 1. 630 . 348 0 . 000 
2 , 974,238 . 054 2,779 ,772 .000 0 . 000 
a 4 , 60 1 , I 90 . l 3 1 3 ' 54 5 ' 94 1 . 000 0 . 000 a 5 , 760;355 . 140 4,428,251 . 000 0 . 000 a 7 , 986,571 . 790 5 , 599 , 902. 000 0 . 000 a 10 , 464 , 440 . 864 6 , 580 , 093 . 000 0 . 000 a 
11 • 57 1 • 123 . 940 7,448 , 567 . 000 0.000 
25 
marine corps O&M subtotal plus a line item for defense nuclear agency 
(from the defense agency branch>, I obtain strategic O&M. These data 
are reported in Table 1. 
The army and a ir force have identical line items for the procurement 
c ategory. These line items are: 1) ballistic missiles , 2> modification 
of missiles, 3) spares and repair of missiles, and 4) support equipment. 
Dividing line item 1 by total expenditure for missile procurement , I 
find a strategic percentage to apply to line items 2, 3, and 4. The 
sum of these three figures plus line item 1 provides the army or air 
force procurement subtotal . From 1982-1985, the air force has an addi-
tional line item for the 8-18 bomber plane program. These 8-18 bomber 
figures were obtained from the Februar y 28, 1984 Senate Budget committee 
hearing report 1 • 
The navy has two strategic procurement line items which are : ll 
ballistic missiles and 2) fleet ballistic ships. A strategic percentage 
is found by dividing the navy 's strategic procurement expenditures by 
the e xpenditures for total navy missile and ship procurement. This per-
centage is applied to the following five support line items : 3) s hip 
support equipment, 4) communications and electronic equ i pment, 5l ordnance 
s uppor t equipment, 6) suppl y support equipment, and 7> personnel and 
command support equipment. For some years there are also line items 
for modification, repairs, and s upport of missiles. 
1 1n 1982, the air force spent $1.61 billion for 8-18 bomber program 
procurement, $4. 04 billion in 1983, $6.12 billion in 1984, and $7 .1 7 
billion in 1985 . 
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In these cases, the percentage of strategic missiles <s tra t egic missiles 
divided by total missile procurement for the na vy> is ap p lied to the 
missile support line items. Summing the above line items y i elds the 
navy procurement subtotal. 
The marine corps has a single str ategic expenditure l i ne item, which 
is guided missiles and equipment. This provi des the marine corps procure-
ment subtotal. 
By summing the army, a i r force, navy, and mar ine corps procurement 
subtotals, I obtain strategic procurement. Tab l e 1 prov ides these da ta . 
The military 's research, development, test, and e va lua t i on <ROT&E > 
category has three strategic li ne items from 1970-1981 and four strategic 
line items from 1981-1985. There were line item descript i on c hanges 
in 1977. Prior to 1977,·the ROT&E line items consisted of : 1 > missiles 
and related equipment, 2l militar y astronautics, and 3 ) program managemen t 
and support. Fifty percent of the fjrs t line item and a ll of the second 
line item are attributed to t he strategic subtotal z . A str ategic per -
centage is found by summing the value from the strategic line items and 
di vi ding by tota l ROT&E. This percentage is applied to the third line 
item. The sum of these three line it ems y ields the strategic ROT&E for 
each year between 1970- 1977. 
For t he years 1977-1985 t he line items are: 1) strategic programs, 
2> advanced technological deve lopment , and 3) program management and 
support. During these years, fifty percent of the second line item and 
2 These assumptions are based on the li ne item descriptions and 
appl y to the 1970- 1977 calculations . 
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all of the first line iteml plus a strategic percentage times the third 
line item is included in the strategic ROT&E . From 1981-1985 the fourth 
line item is fo r the B-18 bomber program. These figures are found in 
the Februar y 28, 1984 Senate Budget Committee hearing report-=. The sum 
of these four line items provides the strategic RDT&E figures for 1981-
1985 . Data for strategic RDT&E are in Table 1 . 
The Department of Energy has five line items which include ll nuclear 
weapons, 2l intelligence, and arms control, 3l nuclear security and 
safety, 4 l naval reactor de velopment and 5l special materials production. 
Where applicable, capital investment for the above line items is also 
included in the st ra tegic calculation. The sum of the above line items 
provides the Department of Energy strategic component. Table 1 contains 
these data. 
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration <NASA) has a single 
line item, space and nuclear research, for 1972 and 1973. This is the 
strategic subtotal for NASA. It is somewhat suspi cious that no other 
strategic research is openly repor ted by NASA. The data for NASA are 
reported in Table 1. 
By summing the strategic category figures for personnel, O&M, pro-
curement, ROT&E, Department of Energy, and NASA, I deri ve the total stra-
teg ic expenditure for a year. The conventional expenditure is the 
1 These assumptions are based on the line item descriptions and 
apply to 1977- 1985 calculations. 
2 In 1981, $0 .22 billion was spent on RDT&E for the 8-18 bomber 
program, $0 . 47 billion in 1982, $0.75 billion in 1983, $0 . 74 billion 
in 1984 and $0 . 51 billion in 1985 . 
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difference between total military e xpenditure as published in SIPRI <1983 , 
1987 ) and the strategic calculation. Both the strategic and conventiona l 
figures for the U. S. can be found in Table 2. The annual line item 
calculations for strategic appropriations are presented in Appendi x D. 
All U. S . data are converted from current dollar figures to constant 
1980 dollars by employing the 1980 price deflater as reported in the 
International Mone tary Fund Yearbook <IMF, 1980 ). 
The strategic data for the United Kingdom are the e f f orts of Dr. 
Keith Hartley from the University of York. Dr. Hartley' s efforts are 
funded by a NATO fellowship. 3 At this time there are insufficient data 
to calculate a strategic time seri es for the United Kingdom which is 
consistant with the detailed U.S . strategic calculation. For thi s reason, 
U.K. strategic procurement will serve as a proxy . Conventiona l militar y 
expenditure is the difference between total military e xpend itur e and 
strategic procurement . GDP figures are obta i ned from the IMF ( 1983, 1987 ) . 
These figures are converted from current pound figu r es to constant figu r es 
by di v iding with the 1980 price deflator <IMF, 1980 ) . All data are 
transformed to U.S. dollars by employ ing the average annual e xchange 
rates. This produces constant 1980 U.S. dollar figures f or the British 
;:sources for these data cons is t of: Statement on Defence Es timates, 
HMSO, London <annual> . House of Commons Defence Committee Reports, HPC 
399 <1986>; HPC 479 <1985>; HPC 37-II <1985>, HMSO , London . Nationa l 
Audit Office, Control and Management of the Trident Programme, HMSO, 
London, HCP 27 <Jul y 1987 >. Publi c Accounts Committee, Ninth Report, 
Chevaline Improvement to Polaris Missile System, HMSO , London, HCP 269 
<March 1982>. 
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a 
Tab le 2: 1970-1985 U. S . Str a tegic and Conventional Aooroor1at1 c ns 
Year 
1970 
197 1 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
CAi l figures in t housa nds of current dollars) 
Str a t egic 
12 , 240 , 332 . 690 
11 • 513 . 442. 184 
12,461,948 . 812 
13,179,745.705 
13,482,579 . 253 
14,531,986 . 543 
14 , 253,340 . 51 7 
16 , 935,614.526 
17 , 874 , 806 . 594 
15,625,776 .893 
18 , 460 , 258. 397 
23,097 , 399 . 151 
25 , 479,788.657 
35 . 070 , 776.'+71 
45,591,953.965 
51,840 , 087 . 760 
15.728 
15. 387 
15 .670 
16 . 735 
15.695 
15 . 978 
15.661 
16 .780 
16 . 362 
12 . 779 
12 . 821 
13 . 596 
12 . 974 
16 . 147 
19 . 233 
19 . 442 
Conventional 
65,586, 667 . 3 10 
63,31 2,557 .8 16 
6 7' 066 '051 . 188 
65,575 . 254 . 295 
72,423,420 . 747 
76 ,416,013.457 
76,759,659 . 483 
83,989 , 385 . 474 
9 1 . J'li:: . 193. 406 
106 , 653.223 . 107 
125,520 , 746 . 603 
146,790 .600 . 849 
170 . 910 , 211 . 343 
182 , 127 . 223 . 529 
191,460 , 046 . 035 
21 4,80 1 . 9 12 . 240 
84 . 272 
84.613 
84 . 330 
83 . 265 
84 . 305 
8'-+ . 022 
84 . 339 
83 . 220 
83 . 638 
87 . 221 
87 . 179 
86 .4(!4 
87 . 026 
83.853 
80 . 767 
80 . 558 
'\J .s. Annual militar v figures from World Armaments and Disarma-
men t : SIPRI Year books <1974 , 1980, 1986l . 
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military strategic and conventional e xpenditures. 
The French strategic data are provided by Dr. Humm from his Ph.D. 
dissertation . Once again, due to limitations of a vailable defense data, 
onl y a procurement time series is calculated. In a fashion simi lar to 
the British data, conventional military expenditures are found as the 
difference of total militar y e xpenditures and strateg ic procurement. 
GDP figures are from the IMF (1983, 1987). French data are also converted 
to constant 1980 U.S. dollars. 
The data for the nonnuclear allies military e xpe nditure are from 
World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbooks <1974, 1980, 1986> and 
the GDP estimates are from IMF <1983 , 1987 >. The implicit price deflater 
for 1980 is employed to convert current e xpenditure f igures to constant 
figures. The average annual exchange rates from IMF ( 1983 ,1987 > are 
applied to transform the local currencies to U. S . dollars. This a llows 
all calculations to be performed on constant 1980 dollar figures. 
Statistical Models and Tests 
My thesis uses three statistical model s to andl yz e NATO al lies ' 
military e xpenditure responsi ve ness . Additionally , each of these models 
is mod i fied to capture changes brough t about by the effects of the Reagan 
adm i n i stration. 
This notation is similar to prev ious models <Murdoch and Sandler, 
1982, 1984, 1986 ), but now d i stingu ishes between conventional and 
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strategic spillins. The joint products military e xpenditure model is 
notated as 
ME 
1
. t= a . +(3 l .G DP . t+(3 2 .CSP . t 1+11 2 .NUC . t 1+e . t 1 1 1 l 1, - l 1, - l 
[ 3. 1] 
for all y i in year t . Data are included from ten NATO allies (i=l , ... ,l Ol 
and for the years 1970-1985 <t=l , ... ,16). This corresponds to the mil1-
tary expenditure equation 2.8 for nonnuclear allies and equati on 2 . 16 
for nuclear allies. 
An all y' s military e xpenditures ar e represented by ME . For nuclear 
allies, this figure is the sum of conventional and strategic expenditures. 
GDP is a country's Gross Domestic Product. Conventional spillins, CSP , 
consists of total alliance conventional expenditures less the respective 
"ally's conventional contribution . Thus, CSP is the net conventional 
benefits an ally may r ecei ve from association with the alliance . For 
the nonnuclear all y , nuclear spillins, NUC, represents the sum of Briti s h, 
French, and U. S . strategic procurement expenditures. The nuclear allies 
receive a net stra tegic spil l in wh ich is simpl y total strategic expendi -
tures <Brit ish , French, and U.S.l less their own strateg ic expenditure. 
Allies, unable to possess perfect foresight, base thei r mil itary 
expenditure decis ion on the best available information (actual spillins 
from last year l . Both CSP and NUC are lagged by one year, t-1, to t ake 
this into account. This will be the same for all statistical models 
in the thesis. 
To capture any affects brought about by the increased U. S . defense 
32 
expenditures <especi all y research and development and strategic expendi-
tures > under the Reagan administration, a dummy variable is included 
in the military model . The dummy, REAGAN, equals zero prior to 1982 
and one from 1982-1985. This equation is specified as 
ME . t=cx . +(.! l .GDP . t+(.! 2 .CSP . t 1+'3 3 .NUC . t 1+13 4 .REAGAN . t+e . t( 3. 2 J l 1 l l l 1, - l 1, - l l l 
for countr y i in year t. 
Another possible way to capture the Reagan impact is to multiply 
each spillin term by a dummy . A model which incorporates this sort of 
specification allows the Reagan administration affect to influence di-
rectly the magnitude <and sign> of an ally's response to CSP and NUC. 
Equation 3.3 represents the joint product military expenditure model 
with a dummy times the spillin terms for country i in year t. 
MEit cxi + (.!liGDPit + (.!2iCSPi,t-1+ (33iD·CSPi,t-l 
+ (.!4iNUCi,t-1 + (35iD·NUCi,t-l + eit 
(3 . 3) 
Once again, the value of the dummy, D, is zero prior to !982 and one 
from 1982- 1985. 
The second statistical model gives additional insight into the be-
havior of the nuclear alliance members . In this model the military 
e xpenditures are disaggregated into the conventional portion, CONV, and 
strategic portion, PRO, for the left-hand side of the equation. This 
allows the CSP and NUC sp1llins to have different influences on the two 
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types of military expenditures. Equation 3.4 is the disaggregate milit ary 
expenditure model and corresponds to equations 2.14 and 2 .1 5 . 
CONVit= ai + (ll iGOPit + (l2iCSPi,t- 1 + (l2iNUCi ,t-1 + eit 
PRO . t= a . + (l l . GDP . t + (l 2 . CSP . t l + (l 3 . NUC . t l + e . t l l l 1 l i, - 1 i , - 1 
[3.4) 
The data are for three nuclear allies (i= l ,2,3> for the years 1970- 1985 
<t =l, .. . ,16 ) . To obtain the net alliance strategic e xpend i ture, NUC, 
I subtract ally i's strategic e xpenditure from total alliance ~trategic 
e xpenditures . CSP is found in a similar manner, as the net alliance 
conventional e xpenditure. 
The latter statistica l model is also modified to capture any impacts 
after 1981 from the Reagan administration. Equation 3.5 represents t he 
model with a dummy var iable and equation 3 . 6 incorporates a dummy times 
the spillin terms. 
CONV . t=a .+fl 1.GDP . t+fl
2
.CSP . t 
1
+a
3
.NUC . t 
1
+(l
4
.REAGAN . +e . C3.5J 
l l l l l 1, - l l, - l it i t 
PRO . t=a . +fl l GOP . t+(l 2 .CSP . t 1
+(l 
3 
.NUC . t 
1
+r'l 4 .REAGAN +e . 
l l l l i l, - l i, - l it it 
CONV 
1
. t = a . + (l l . GOP . t + (l 2 . CSP . t l + (l 
3
. D · CSP . 
l l i l l, - i i, t - 1 
PRO it = a i + (lliGOPit + (l2iCSPi , t-l + (l3iD·CSPi , t-l 
+ (l 4 . NUC . t l + (l S . D · NUC . t l + e . i l, - i i, - it 
( 3 . 6) 
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The final statistical model focuses on only U.S. strategic appro-
priations as nuclear spillins. Since the United States is the dominant 
strategic ally, and Britain and France have only recently become credible 
in strategic capabilities, it is reasonable to assume that the alliance 
members may respond in a different way to U.S. strategic spillins. 
The joint product military expenditure model using only U.S. stra-
tegic appropriations as spillins is specified as 
(3 . 7] 
To capture the effects of the Reagan administration, 1 incorporate 
a dummy variab le in the same manner as the previous models. The dummy 
can either be a separate variable denoted in equation 3 . 8, or multiplied 
by the spillin terms as in equation 3.9. 
MEit = ai + (!liGDPit + (!2iCSPi,t-1 + (!3iUSSTRATi,t-1 
+ (l i lEAGAN i t + e i t 
ME i t = a i + (! 1 i GDP i t + (! 2 i CSP i , t - 1 + (! 3 i D -CSP i , t-1 
+ _ (l 4 iUSSTRATi,t-l + (l 5 iD ·USSTRATi,t-l + eit 
E3.8J 
[3 . 9] 
Each of the equations in Chapter III is estimated using ordinary least 
squares (QLSl on each ally's data set'+ . By analyzing the t-statistic, 
~Agresti and Agresti, 1979, pp. 290-291, 327-338. Judge et al., 
1982, pp. 479-480. 
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it is possible to comment on the level of significance of a particular 
parameter estimate. The R-square statistic , or the coefficient of de-
termination, shows the degree to which the independent variables in the 
model explain the var iation in the dependent variable. The Durbin-Watson 
statistic CDW> ind icates whether or not first-order autocorrelation e x-
ists. If the OW statistic is less than the lower bound critical OW value, 
then autocorrelation exists; if however, the OW statistic is considerabl y 
greater than the upper bound critical OW value, then negati ve au t ocor r e-
lation e xi sts. 
The United States equation, under some model specificat i ons, does 
indicate the presence or first-order autocorrelation; conversely, the 
Netherlands equation, under all model specifications, indicates the pres-
ence of negative first - order autocorrelation . The Cochrane-Orcutt test 
is used to correct for first-order autocorrelation. This method uses 
the least squares residuals to estimate r ho in an iterative procedure . 
The corrected results for the U.S. and Netherlands equations reveal no 
more signs of autocorrelation. 
Estimation and discussion of these nine equations are presented 
in the next chapter . 
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CHAPTER IV. RESULTS ANO DISCUSSION 
Estimating equation 3.1, the demand for military expenditures, by 
ordinary least squares COLS> produces the results in Table 3. The high 
A-square statistic for each country's equation, when vi ewed in conjunction 
with the Durbin-Watson test and the number of statistically significant 
parameter estimates, suggests that the independent variables do a good 
job of explaining the variation in military e xpenditure. The Durbin-
Watson <OWl critical bounds are listed in a footnote below the table. 
Using OLS, the Netherlands equation has first-order autocorre lation. 
Table 3 reports the AR Cll corrected results for the Netherlands. 
As expected, all coefficients for GOP are positive and significant 
at the 0.05 level <with the exception of the U.S.>. This indicates that 
militar y expenditures are an economic decision based on the country' s 
GOP and that military e xpenditures are normal goods. The GDP coeff1c1ent 
estimates range from 0.01 CCanadal to 0.05 <Belgium ) . Simil ar responses 
are found among Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom, 
and West Germany--each with a GOP coefficient estimate of appro x imately 
0.02. 
Overall, the coefficient estimates support the impure public goods 
theory for alliance defense. Positive coefficient estimates for conven-
tional spillins CCSP> mean that an ally increases military expenditures 
as other alliance members increase conventional spending. Notice that 
all s~atistically significant CSP estimates are positive. A negati ve 
NUC parameter estimate Co r a positive value less than CSP > signifies 
Table 3. OLS coefficient estimates for the demand of military e xpendi-
tures using 1980 exchange rates : Strategic procurement spil-
lins and conventional spillins <t statistics in parentheses ) 
ME . t=a . +fl l .GDP . t+(! 
2 
.CSP . t 1+r'! 3 .NUC . t 1+e .·t l l l l l 1, - l l, - l 
Nation 
Vari able 
GDP 
CSP 
NUC 
Constant 
R-square 
Rho 
United 
States 
0.004 
<0.17) 
0.244 
(0.31) 
46.335 
<7 . 77) 
-25.458 
( -1. 26) 
1. 081 
0 . 94 
France 
0.040** 
( 19 . 13 ) 
0.030** 
(4.24) 
-0.209** 
(-3.59) 
-5.738H 
(-5.89) 
1. 493 
0.99 
a Autocorrelation corrected using AR ( l ) . 
b 
United 
Kingdom 
0.029** 
(3 . 84 ) 
0.063** 
(4.94) 
0. 011 
<O. 10 > 
-2.921 
(-1 . 07 ) 
2.243 
0 . 93 
Canada 
0 . 0 lO·o 
(4.54 ) 
0 .014** 
(4.44 ) 
0 . 052• 
( 1. 97 ) 
-1.297** 
(-2.95 ) 
2. 08 2 
0 . 95 
Durbin-Watson test significant points at . 05 l evel: dl = 0 .814, 
~ = 1. 750. 
**Statistically significant two tail t-test at . 05 level: t =2.20 1; 
for Nether l ands equation t=2.228. 
•Statistically significant two tail t-test at .1 0 level: t =l . 796 ; 
for Netherlands equation t=l.812. 
Belgium 
0 . 050** 
<9.97) 
- 0 . 0004 
(-0 . 15> 
- 0 . 023 
(-1 .12 l 
-1 . 791 ** 
( -4.70> 
Nether-
! ands a 
0 . 024** 
( 16. 91) 
0.003 
(2 .82> 
- 0 . 01 4 
( -1 . 27) 
0.768** 
(4 .58) 
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Denmark 
0 . 021 ** 
<3 . 87 ) 
0 . 002* 
( 1 . 84 ) 
-0.026** 
<-2.87) 
-0 . 151 
(-0 . 77> 
Norway 
0 . 024** 
(6 . 95) 
- 0 . 0001 
( -0. !0l 
0 . 0 10 
( l. 01) 
0.297 
{ l. 72) 
West 
Germany 
0 . 0231H 
(6. 17) 
0 . 007 
<0 . 55 ) 
- 0 . 11 I 
( -J.13 ) 
7.458** 
(3 . 93 ) 
lta l y 
0 . 0 13-!H 
<S . 16> 
-0 . 002 
(- 0 .23l 
0 . 089 
( 1.52 ) 
4 .297* 
{4 . 68 l 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
l . 766 2.704 1. 746 2.428 0 . 939 1 . 912 
0.95 0 . 96 0 .88 0 . 94 0 . 90 0 . 85 
- 0 , 746H 
(-3 .58 ) 
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free riding behavior. 
Looking at the French equation, for e xample, the parameter e s timates 
ma y be interpreted as follows. A b i llion dollar increase in French GDP 
will generate a 40 million dollar i ncrease in military e xpenditures. 
A $30 million increase in French militar y e xpenditures will result from 
a one billion dollar increase in CSP, and a one billion dollar increase 
in NUC will cause the French to reduce military e xpend itures by 2 1 milli on 
dollars. These r esults suggest complementary characteristi cs between 
CSP and militar y e xpenditures and free riding behavior on NUC (i .e., 
substitute characteristics between NUC and military e xpenditures >. 
The Norway and Ital y equat i ons reveal unpredicted responses to CSP 
and NUC . Note, however, that these parameter estimates are not statis-
tically significant. Both countries are flanking nations to WARSAW Pact 
countries; therefore NATO ass igns add i tional conventional for ces fo r 
prote~ti on. This may partially e xplain the unanticipated r e sponse t o 
spilli ns . Canada has a sta ti stically sign i ficant positi ve coefficient 
for CSP 1 a s theory suggests, but has a lar ger positive NUC coefficient . 
As in previ ous empirical s tudies , t he U.S. equation is not similar to 
the other NATO allies . The onl y statistica ll y signi ficant estimate is 
for NUC, and thi s i~ a ver y l a rge coefficient . The United Sta tes , be ing 
the only strategic member capable of mutual assured destruction, mdy 
respond differentl y than other all ies to spillins from the alliance. 
Currently the U. S . is in the mi dst of a large mu lti - year strategic pro-
curement program <the 8- 18 bomber planes) and the Brit i sh and French 
are both upgrading the ir outdated nuclear forces . Thi s wil l influence 
the NUC coefficient to be either positive or a relatively small negative 
value. 
Including a dummy variable to monitor the impact of the Reagan ad-
ministration does not improve the explanatory capabilities of the equa-
tions . The results for the model incorpora ting a dummy used as a separate 
independent variable are in Table 6 of Appendix E, while Table 7 contains 
the coefficient esti mates for a dummy times the spillin terms. To inter-
pret the results in Table 7, the spillin coefficient after 1981 is the 
. sum of CSP and D·CSP or NUC and D·NUC. 
For the first time, it is possible to distinguish the response of 
conventional and strategic procurement expenditures to both nuclear and 
conven tional spi lli ns. The empirical results in Table 4 support the 
notion of free riding on deterrence and increasing mil i tar y expenditures 
in response to conventional spillins . Again, the statistical tests 1nd1 -
cate a good model. The U. S. equation has been corrected for autocor-
relation. 
France and Britain base conventional defense expenditures on the 
Gross Domestic Product <estimates are positive and significant at the 
0.05 level> . For all three nuclear allies, conventional spillins generate 
an increase in both c onventional and strategic procurement e xpenditures 
<no te that all CSP coefficients are significant at the 0 . 05 level e x-
ceptfor U.S. conventional expenditures>. This reinforces the notion 
of comp lements between nuclear allies ' military expenditures and alliance 
conventional spillins. France and the United Kingdo m treat nuclear spil-
lins as substitutes for provision of strategic forces. The French 
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Table 4 . OLS coefficient estimates f or nuclear countries ' demand of 
disaggregate mil itary expenditures using 1980 e xchange rates : 
Strategic procurement spillins and conventional spillins <t 
statistics in parentheses > 
PRDit ai + (lliGOPit +(l2iCSPi,t-1 +(l31NUCi,t-l + e it 
CONVit=ai + (3 liGDPit +(l2iCSP i ,t-1 +(l3iNUC i ,t-l +eit 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- --
Nation United United United United 
State s a States France France t<: ingdom t<i nadom 
Variable PRO CONV PRO CONV PRO CONV 
-------- ---------------------------------------------------------- -------
GDP 0.013* 
( 1 . 92) 
CSP 0.840* 
<2.18) 
NUC 3 . 480 
co . 72l 
Constant -166.767 
( 1 . 75) 
R-square 
Rho 
I 
1. 997 
0 . 78 
0 . 944** 
<1 4.44) 
-0.001 
(-0 . 06) 
0.441 
C0.67l 
42.539** 
<B.48 l 
-24.484 
(- 1.44 ) 
1.599 
0.95 
0 .002* 
C2.08l 
0.010H· 
(3.84) 
-0.019 
( -0 . 88 ) 
- 0.348 
(-0 . 99 ) 
1. 0 18 
0.87 
0 .038** 
<22. 02 l 
0.0200 
C3 . 42 l 
- 0 . 190** 
( -3.92) 
-5. 389-H 
( -6.63 ) 
2 . 007 
0 . 99 
0 . 001 H 
( 2. 11 ) 
0 . 007H 
(7 . 66) 
-0.003 
(-0.43) 
- l .498H 
(-8.16 ) 
2 . 262 
0 .95 
0 . 028** 
<3 . 68) 
0 . 057** 
\ 4 .41 ) 
0 . 01 4 
( 0 . 13) 
- 1 . t:+23 
1- 0 .S2 > 
2 . 221 
0 . 92 
--------!-------------------------------------------------------- ---------
aAutoc orrelation corrected using AR <l l . 
b . 
Durbin-Watson test sign ifican t point at .05 level: dl =0 . 814 
du =1 . 750 . 
**Statisticall y significant two tai l t - test at .05 leve l: t=2.20 1 : 
for U. S. equation t=2.228. 
*Statisticall y significant two tail t-test at .1 0 leve l : t=l . 796 : 
for U. S equation t=l.812. 
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conventional expenditures decrease as NUC increases, whereas the British 
treat NUC spillins as complements to conventional expenditures . The 
U. S . response to nuclear spillins is to increase both conventional e x-
penditures (significant at the 0.05 level> and strategic procurement. 
Because French and British independent strategic capabilities are not 
yet credible, the U.S. does not free ride on strategic spillins. In 
fact, a positive NUC coefficient for U. S. strategic procurement signifies 
that the U.S . increases strategic procurement in response to an increase 
in NUC, perhaps to maintain its dominant strategic status. 
Using the United States strategic calculations as a pro xy for the 
alliance nuclear spillin term, equation 3.7, I obtain the coefficient 
estimates in Table 5. Both the U.S. and Netherlands equations are cor-
rected for autocorrelation. The results are similar to the estimates 
in Table 3 . 
Each country (excluding the United States) has a positive and sig-
nificant <at the 0.05 level> coefficient estimate for GDP. For a one 
billion dollar increase in GDP, there is a 1 million dollar increase 
in Canadian and Italian mi litary expenditures; appro xi matel y 2 million 
dollar increase in defense for Denmark, the Netherlands, and West Germany ; 
Norway and the U. K. each allot an additional 3 million dollars towards 
defense expenditures; the French militar y budge t i nc reases by 4 million 
dollars ; and Belgium spends an add i tional 5 mill ion on defense. All 
statistically significant <at the . 05 level ) coefficient esti mates for 
CSP are positi ve. Complementarity is present between a country ' s militar y 
expenditure and alliance convent ional spillins. There is a l a rge 
Table 5 . OLS coefficient estimates for the demand of military e xpendi-
tures using 1980 exchange rates : U.S. strategic spill ins 
<t statistics in parentheses ) 
Nation 
Variable 
United 
States 
GDP 0 .006 
<0 . 25> 
CSP 3.693** 
USSTRAT 
Constant 
__ b ________ _ 
ow 
R-square 
<3 . 46) 
-252.145* 
(-2.16) 
1. 940 
0.94 
Rho 0 .743** 
(6 .32) 
France 
0.039** 
( 18.61) 
0.044** 
<4 .78l 
-0.1 09H 
(-3 . 56 ) 
-6.002** 
( -6 . 33) 
I. 619 
0 .99 
United 
Kingdom 
0.029** 
<3.82) 
0.063** 
(4 .12 l 
0.047 
<0 . 83) 
-2.992 
(-1. 09 ) 
2 . 276 
0 . 93 
Canada 
0 . 0 11** 
(4.82 l 
0 . 012** 
(3.20 l 
0 . 039·H 
<2.90 ) 
-1. 244H· 
(-2 .92 ) 
2. 093 
0 .95 
------------!-----------------------------------------------------------
aAutocorrelation corrected using AR<l l . 
b . 
Durbin-Watson test significant points at . 05 leve l : d L- 0 .814 
du = i. 750. 
**Statisticall y significant two tail t-test at . 05 level: t=2.201; 
for U. S . equation t=2 . 179; for Netherlands equation t=2.228 . 
*Statistically significant one tail t-test at . 05 l e vel: t=l.796 : 
for U.S. equation t=l.782; for Netherlands equation t=l.812. 
Belgium 
0 .048** 
<9 . 85 ) 
0.001 
<0 . 50 l 
-0 . 017 
C- 1. 70> 
-1. 784++ 
( -4.94 ) 
Nether-
1 ands a 
0 . 024H 
(16 .47 > 
0 . 003++ 
(2 .62) 
-0 . 006 
( -1 . 0 4 ) 
0 . 755H 
(4 .54 ) 
Denmark 
0 . 0 19·H 
(3 .69) 
0 .003+• 
(2.45 ) 
-0. 0 14** 
(-3. 04) 
- 0 . 156 
( - 0 .83 ) 
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Norway 
0 . 025** 
( 6.86 ) 
-0.0006 
(-0 . 37) 
0 . 006 
( 1. 14 ) 
0.319• 
( 1 . 80) 
Wes t 
Germany 
0 . 0 23 
(5.85 ) 
0 . 008 
C0.54) 
-0. 046 
( -0.86 ) 
7 .433** 
<3 . P= > 
Ital y 
0 . 0 13* 
C5 .50l 
-0. 006 
( - 0 . 8 0) 
0 . 057• 
<I. 95) 
4 . 433* 
(4 . 99 l 
--------------------------------------------------------------------
1.807 2 .715 1. 841 2.501 0 . 869 2. 0 16 
0 .96 0 . 96 0 .89 0.94 0.90 0 .86 
-0.747•* 
<-3 .55 > 
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variation in CSP parameter estimates; 3.69 for the United States and 
0.003 for the Netherlands and Denmark. Not all statistically significant 
USSTRAT estimates support the notion of free riding. The estimates for 
France and Denmark are both negative, as theory suggests, indicating 
a decrease in military expenditures as USSTRAT spillins increase. The 
Canadian and Italian equations are counter intuitive, both revealing 
a positive military e xpenditure response to a USSTRAT increase. These 
two equations also were abberations under equation 3.1, but the results 
were not statistically significant at the 0.05 level. For this reason, 
I favor equation 3.1 NUC proxy <the sum of British , French and U. S. stra-
tegic procurement) over the USSTRAT proxy equation. 
Adding a separate dummy variable to monitor the impact from the 
Reagan administration after 1981 does not lend additional support to 
the joint products theory. These coefficient estimates are in Table 
8 of Appendix E . Multipl ying a dummy variable by each of the spillin 
terms does cause the Italian equation to support the joint products 
theory. The sum of CSP and D·CSP <significant at the 0 . 05 level> yields 
a posit ive value and the sum of USSTRAT (significant at the 0.05 level> 
and D·USSTRAT produces a negative coefficient. The Norwa y equation also 
improves, although the results are not sign i ficant at the 0 .05 leve l. 
Table 9 contains the r e s ul ts for equation 3.9, the demand for militar y 
expenditures using USSTRAT as spillin proxy and including a dummy variable 
times the spillin terms. 
Since procurement is the most visible part of strategic expenditures, 
also use U.S. strategic procurement as a proxy for the alliance 
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strategic spillins. In Appendix E, the results for the demand fo r mi li-
tary e xpend itures using USPRO as spillin are in Table 10, while Table 
11 includes the separate dummy variable, and Table 12 includes a dummy 
times the spillin terms . Jn general, the significant coefficient esti-
mates support the complementary response to CSP and a free riding response 
<e xcept for Canada ) to U.S. strategic procurement. There are minimal 
differences in parameter estimate values, which suggests that the USSTRAT 
and USPRO proxies generate the same influence on other allies ' military 
expenditure behavior . 
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CHAPTER V. CONCLUSION 
The mai n objective of my thesis has been to construct a strategic 
expenditure time series for the NATO alliance and to test the joint prod-
ucts theory against a good proxy for strategic and conventional spil l ins . 
Not knowing a priori the best proxy for the strategic time series, I 
use three different procedures to calculate the strategic expenditure 
proxy. First, the strategic spillin for equations 3.1-3.3 is the sum 
of British, French and U.S. strategic procurement. Procurement figures 
are used because detailed information is not accessible for French and 
British military expenditures. Moreover, these proxies are reliable 
since strategic procurement is the most visible to other allies. The 
second strategic proxy for equations 3.7-3.9 is total U.S. strategic 
expenditures. A similar set of equations is tested using the third prox y , 
U.S . strategic procurement expenditures. 
The empirical results, using all methods of calculating the strategic 
spillin proxy, support the joint products theory for alliance defense. 
Almost all statistically significant estimates reveal the correct coef-
ficient sign to support the theory. A positive value for o ME / oI shows 
that military expenditures are economic decisions based on the Gross 
Domestic Product of the respective ally. Moreover, militar y e xpenditures 
are normal goods. The conventional spillins from an alliance i nduce 
,,.., 
an increase in an ally's military expenditures Ci.e., oME/oQ>Ol . Con-
ventional military expenditures have both private and impure public char-
acteristics which reflect complementar y behavior between conventional 
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spillins and conventional military expenditures. Free riding behavior 
,..,, 
is noticed for strategic spillins <i.e . , !ME /~S < Ol owing to the pure 
public nature of these expenditures. 
Additional insight is also gi ven to the three nuclear allies' mili-
tary expenditures by disaggregating strategic and conventional e xpenditure 
responses. Each of these countries is in the midst of a sizeable str a -
tegic modification or build-up program, so the anticipated free riding 
between strategic spillins and strategic expenditures is reduced. 
The results in my thesis differ in some respects from prev ious em-
pirical tests by Murdoch and Sandler <1984>. In particular, by disag-
gregating spillins,· the French and British military responses are dif-
ferent from each other. Murdoch and Sand l er <1984 ) could not reject 
the hypothesi s that the medium-sized nuclear powers ha ve identical mil i-
tary e xpenditure responses to income <GOP> and total spill i ns . S i mi larl y , 
Murdoch and Sandler <1984 ) do not reject the hypothesis that Belgium 
and the Netherlands respond similarly to GDP and spillins, whereas my 
disaggregate spillins reveal that these countries behave differentl y. 
This imp lies that disaggregation of the joint products does matter. 
A separate equation with disaggregate sp i llins should be used f or each 
all y to capture precise military e xpend i ture responses. 
The results are also sensiti ve to the t i me period of the data. 
Th i s suggests that over time strategic capabilities and diplomatic con-
siderations influence the defense doctrine , whi c h in turn has an impact 
on military e xpenditure responses within an alliance . Addit i onall y , 
technological advancements in defense i nfluence allies' mi litary 
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expenditures. 
Developing a method to distinguish these military responses is ex-
tremely important in light of the level of military e xpenditures within 
NATO. Using these strategic time series pro xies and the empirical results 
from the joint products model, it is possible to anal yze any changes 
in an all y' s GDP, conventional spillins or strategic spillins. Extension 
of these results can help in the analysis of NATO policy changes, im-
provements in defense technology or changes in an ally's defense contri-
bution. Construction of the strategic time series will also e nable fur-
ther statistical tests to anal yze the NATO alliance or the military ex-
penditures of individual allies within NATO. 
Future studies may obtain more precise militar y expenditure responses 
to conventional and strategic spillins by constructing a comparable time 
series for British, French and U.S. total strategic expenditures. This 
will require accessing detailed military expenditure records for both 
Britain and France and developing a consistent procedure for calculating 
the total strategic proxy . At this point, the general behavior patterns 
have been captured using French, British and U.S. strategi~ procurement 
as the proxy. Another area for e xpansion is to construct a time series 
d i stinguishing NATO military expenditures for European defense (versus 
all other all iance military expenditures>. Such a European defense dis-
aggregat ion could provide further insights of alleged European free riding 
behavior. In addition , continued refinement of alliance spillins may 
reveal that the equations for Canada, Italy, Norway and the U.S. full y 
support the joint products theory of defense. 
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In an effort to distinguish the pri vate and public benefits of de-
fense, my thesis has studied the response of alliance members ' military 
expenditures to disaggregated defense spillins. The procedure used her e 
is not limited to economic analysis of defense. Rather, any activit y 
which produces both private and public goods should be analyzed by dis-
aggregating the effects from the joint products. Refining the technique 
to anal yze joint product acti v ities leaves r oom for improved e conomi c 
analysis in areas including education , charit i es, police forces , and 
environmental economics. 
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APPENDI X A: 
THEORY DERlvATIONS 
The representative nuclear ally's problem can be written as 
,...., 
maxi mize U<y , x, Z, s + SJ 
subject to x = f(ql 
~ ,_ 
z = g (ql , z = h(Q ) 
,,...,, 
z = 2 + z 
= y + p q + p s. 
c s 
By substitut i on, this problem can be reformu lated as 
,..,, ,._, 
~aximize)U<y, f <q l + h (Q) , s + Sl 
\y, q' s 
subject to I= y + pcq + pss. 
,,..., -Assuming that Q and Sare fi xed, we have the following first - order condi -
tions: 
y : u - A = 0 CA. 1 J y 
q: f'U + g ·u - Ap = 0 CA.2J x z c 
s : u p = 0 CA.3J s s 
). : y + p cq + p s = I ' CA . 4J s 
where A is the associated Lagrangian multiplier and the s ubscr i pts on 
the U terms denote partial der i vati ves -- e . g., U = 6U / oy. Equations 
y 
A.1 and A. 2 can be reorganized to give 
f ' MRS + g'MRS = p c ' 
xy zv [A . 5J 
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and equations lA and 3A can be altered to yi eld 
MRS = p • 
s y s 
(A . 6 J 
Finall y , equations A.5 and A.6 can be rear ranged to give equation 2 . 17 
of the text. The nonnuclear all y problem is treated in a sim il ar f ashion . 
The demand equations follow, v ia the implicit function theorem, from 
equations A.1 to A.4. 
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APPENDIX 8: 
FIRST-ORDER AUTOREGRESSION FORECAST FOR 
1982-1985 STRATEG IC PERSONNEL 
Caution must be taken in making a forecast based on a s mall data 
set. For this reason, I have carefull y selected a forecast pr ocedur e 
and anal y zed the diagnostic tests for model adequacy . 
To eliminate the problems inherent in current do ll ar figures (1 .e., 
inflation ) for military appropriations, evaluate the stra t eg ic per s onne l 
subtotals fo r 1970-1981 as the percentage of to t al per s onnel whi ch 1s 
strategic. Each year ' s percentage represents a data poi nt <twel ve t o ta l >. 
The mean is 12.34 and the standard dev iation is 0.9569. The aut oc orre-
lation of these data points produces an oscillating pat t ern wi t h overa ll 
geometric decay and decay among the oscillations. This i s t he same gen-
eral pattern which is observed in a second-order auto r egress ion proce s s . 
The autocorrelation check for white noise analy zes t he data t o 
determine whether the autocorrelation among the points is due t o wh i te 
noise . Prior to any model specification , the probab i l ity tha t t he da ta 
are caused by white noise is 0 . 00. In other word s , some pa t ter n e xists 
among the raw data. Therefore, it i s necessary to f i t a mode l . 
One possible model for forecasting i s the second-order 
autoregression , notated hereafter as AR <2 >. The ARC 2 ) al l ows the val ue 
of the prev ious two periods t o influence the value f or the c ur r ent pe r i od . 
In equation form the basic AR C2 > is represented as 
CB. 1 J 
PROC ARIMA, the ~omputer package , runs AR <2 > on the data , the n prov i des 
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diagnostic information to judge if the model is adequately specified. 
The parameter estimates for the mean, ~l, and ~2 are all significant 
based on the t-statistics. 
The autocorrelation check on the fitted model <which incorporates 
the portmanteau asymptotic chi square test) determines the probability 
that the residuals are merely white noise. If the model specification 
is good, then all explainable elements of correlation will be fitted 
within the model and the residual s will be white noise. The r esult of 
the autocorrelation check of residuals reveals an e xtremel y high proba-
bility, 0.799. This suggests that the residuals are white noise and 
that the model is correctly specified. 
The autocorrelation of residuals reveals no discernible pattern. 
Likewise, the partial autocorrelation of residuals produces no pattern 
to the ARC2l fitted model residuals. Again this supports a belief that 
the model is correctly chosen . 
Since the model appears to be adequate from these various tests, 
four point estimates are predicted using AR<2>. The point estimates 
are intuitively appealing and seem to follow the general trend of s tra-
tegic defense appropriations. 
To convert these forecast percentages of strategic personnel to 
dollar values, simp l y multiply the point estimate times the personnel 
budget for the appropriate year . 
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APPENDIX C: 
PERCENTAGE OF STRATEGIC APPROPRIATIONS BY CATEGORY 
Year Personnel 0 g, M Procurement RDnE Total 
1970 11.937 16.859 13.048 26.286 15.728 
1971 11. 929 17 .610 13.477 22.441 15 . 387 
1972 12 . 633 18. 722 15.073 19.181 15.670 
1973 13.557 20. 093 15. 106 19.696 16.735 
1974 14.037 19 . 145 13.318 21. 775 15.695 
1975 13.462 19.458 17 .343 20.612 15.978 
1976 13.095 18.862 10 . 788 20 . 268 15 . 661 
1977 12 .109 17 . 750 12. 185 27 . 80 1 16 . 780 
1978 11 . 708 16.401 13 . 690 27.713 16 . 362 
1979 11. 443 16 . 784 5.349 21.653 12.779 
1980 11.149 17. 202 7 . 030 22.004 12 . 821 
1981 11.034 16. 056 6.346 20 . 21/ 13 . 596 
1982 11 . 3241 15 .627 5. 42ef 20.15cf 12.974 
1983 11 . 0121 15.259 7 . 99cf 42.39ef 16.147 
1984 12. 29-r 15.110 13 .a2cf 37. 90-f 19.233 
1985 12. 6391 14. 980 12. 9 l:f 36.20/ 19 . 442 
-------------------------
1 
Forecast value usi no AR<2 >. 
2 
8-18 bomber appropriati ons. I ncludes program 
5o 
APPENDIX D: 
ANNUAL U.S. STRATEGIC CALCULATIONS 
<All fi .;•ires in thousands of dollars) 
1970 
PERSONNEL 
<Strategic percentage is found by divi ding e xpenditures for strategic 
personnel forces by total expenditures for personnel forces. > 
Army 
1. Strategic forces 
2. 2.llOY.x Research & development 
3. 2 .l lOY. x Central suppl y & maint 
4. 2 . ll OY.x Training 
5. 2 . 110Y.x Administration 
Army Subtotal 
Navy 
1. Strategic forces 
2. 5.280Y.x Research & development 
3. 5.280Y.x Central suppl y & maint 
4. 5.280Y.x Training 
5. 5.280Y.x Administration 
Na vy Subtotal 
Air Force 
1. Strategic forces 
2. 44.317Y.x Research & development 
3. 44.317Y.x Central supply & maint 
4. 44.317Y.x Training 
5. 44.317Y.x Administration 
Air Force Subtotal 
Marine Corps 
1. Stra tegi c forces 
2. 0.080Y.x Research & development 
3. 0.080Y.x Central supply ~ maint 
4. 0.080Y.x Training 
5. 0 . 080Y.x Adm i ni stration 
Marine Corps Subtotal 
STRATEGIC PERSONNEL 
91,234.000 
1,386 . 460 
1,786.284 
7 1,242.800 
2,44 1.249 
168,090.793 
139,648.000 
~,448.262 
5,703.139 
76, 81 0.747 
4,648.512 
230,258 . 660 
1,415,993.000 
84,619.766 
49,327 . 037 
654,991 . 079 
80,329.881 
2,285,260 . 763 
709.000 
0.382 
14.459 
513 . 070 
32.44 1 
1,269 .352 
2,684,879.568 
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OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE 
<Strategic percentage is found by dividing e xpend i tures for strateg i c 
forces by e xpenditures for total forces. > 
Army 
1. Strategic forces 
2. 3.212%x Central suppl y & maint 
3. 3.212%x Training 
4. 3 . 212%x Administration 
Army Subtotal 
Navy 
1. Strategic forces 
2. 10.625%x Central suppl y & ma i nt 
3. 10.625%x Tra i ning 
4. 10 .625%x Administration 
Navy Subtotal 
Air Force 
1. Strategic forces 
2. 49.494%x Central suppl y & ma i nt 
3. 49 . 4941.x Training 
4. 49.494%x Administration 
Air Force Subtotal 
Marine Corps 
1. Strateg ic forces 
2 . 0 . 003%x Central s uppl y & ma int 
3 . 0.0031.x Training 
~. 0 . 003~x Administration 
Marine Corps Subtotal 
STRATEGIC OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE 
77 ,805 .000 
76, 945 . 098 
38,749.825 
10,270. 627 
203, 770. 550 
212, 769.000 
222,166.944 
50,531.544 
19 ' 879 . 163 
505,346.651 
1,138,211.000 
1 '230 '941 • 022 
327,421.123 
87,577. 158 
2,784,150.303 
6.000 
4.550 
1.249 
0 . 812 
12 . ol 1 
3 ,493 , 280 .11 5 
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PROCUREMENT 
<S trategic percentage app l ied to support or maintenance procure ment 
line items is found by dividing e xpenditures for strategic 
pr 0cur ement by e xpenditures for total procurement.) 
Army 
1. Othe r missiles 
2. O.OOO'l.x Modification of missiles 
3 . O.OOO'l.x Spa res and repair 
4 . O.OOO'l.x Support equipment 
Army Subtotal 
Navy 
1. Ballistic mi ssiles 
2. Fleet ballistic missile ships 
3. 16 . 153'l.x Ship support equipment 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0 . 000 
4. 16.153'l.x Co mmun & electronic equip 
529,800.000 
354,700 . 000 
83,139. 49 1 
45,293.012 
79 , 763 .514 5 . 16.1 53%x Ordna nce support equip 
6. 16 . 153'l.x Supply support equipment 
7. 16.153%x Comma nd support equip 
8. 70 . 172'l.x Modification of missiles 
2,083.737 
4,619.758 
14' 104. 572 
24,279.512 
7 ,578.576 
9 . 70 .1 72'l.x Spares ) nd repairs 
10 . 70 . 172%x Support equipment 
Navy Subtotal 
Air Force 
1. Ballistic missiles 
1,145,362.172 
2. 86.744%x Modificat i on of missiles 
457,400.000 
147, 11 7 .824 
60 ,200 .336 
689,354.568 
3 . 86 . 744'l.x Spares and repa ir 
4. 86.744'l.x Other support 
Air Force Subtotal 
Marine Corps 
1 . Guide d missiles & equipment 
Marine Corps Subtotal 
STRATEGIC PROCUREMENT 
1 '50 1 ' 1 90. 552 
3,300.000 
3,300 . 000 
2,649,852.724 
1Strategic percentage is f ound by dividing e xpenditures for strategic 
RDT&E by e xpenditures for total RDT&E.l 
1. 50%x Missiles & related equip 
2. Militar y astronautics 
3 . 26.554%x Program mgmt & support 
STRATEGIC RDT&E 
1,142,200.500 
673,770.000 
139,424 . 698 
J, 955,395 . 198 
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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 
l . Nava l reactor deve lopment 207,285 . 000 
808, 150 . 000 
179,951 . 000 
2. Weapons 
3 . Special materials production 
CAPITAL INVESTMENT : 
4. Naval reactor dev 
5 . Wea pons 
6 . Speci a l materials production 
78,073 . 158 
159,698 . 000 
23,767 .927 
STRATEGIC DE?ARTMENT OF ENERG Y 1,456,925. 085 
1. Space and nuclear research tech 0 . 000 
STRATEGIC NASA 0 . 000 
PERSONNEL 2 ,684,879 . 568 
0 & M 3,493,280.115 
PROCUREMENT 2,649,852 . 724 
RDT&E 1, 955,395 .1 98 
ENERGY 1,456, 925. 085 
NASA 0 . 000 
1970 STRATEGIC 12 . 240,332.690 
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PERSONNEL 
<Strategic percentage is found by dividing expenditures for strategic 
personnel forces by total expenditures for personnel forces.) 
Army 
1. Strategic forces 
2. l.840Y.x Research & development 
3. 1.840Y.x Central supply & maint 
4. 1.840Y.x Training 
5. 1.840Y.x Administration 
Army Subtotal 
Navy 
1. Strategic forces 
2. 5.200Y.x Research & development 
3. 5.200Y.x Central supply & maint 
4. 5.200Y.x Training 
5. 5.200Y.x Administration 
Navy Subtotal 
Air Force 
1. Strategic forces 
2. 44.226Y.x Research & development 
3. 44.226Y.x Central supply ~ maint 
4. 44.226Y.x Training 
5. 44.226Y.x Administration 
Air Force Subtotal 
Marine Corps 
1. Strategic forces 
2. 0.093Y.x Research & development 
3. 0.093Y.x Central supply & maint 
4. 0.093Y.x Training 
5. 0.093Y.x Administration 
Marine Corps Subtotal 
STRATEGIC PERSONNEL 
75,359.000 
1,509.223 
2,149.249 
55,786.003 
2,542.917 
137,346.392" 
128,734.000 
3,425.292 
5,496.400 
74,466.860 
4,814.420 
216,936.972 
1,380,677.000 
85,939.521 
37,501.437 
674,515.493 
86,906.301 
2,265,539.752 
753.000 
0.515 
17.837 
502.308 
41.085 
1,314.745 
2,621,137.861 
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OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE 
<Strategic percentage is found by dividing expenditures for strategic 
forces by expenditures for total forces.) 
Army 
1. Strategic forces 
2. 4.760Y.x Central supply & maint 
3. 4.760Y.x Training 
4. 4.760Y.x Administration 
Army Subtotal 
Navy 
1. Strategic forces 
2. 13.794Y.x Central supply & maint 
3. 13.794Y.x Training 
4. 13.794Y.x Administration 
Navy Subtotal 
Air Force 
1. Strategic forc es 
2. 48.812Y.x Central supply & maint 
3. 48.812Y.x Training 
4. 48.812Y.x Administration 
Air Force Subtotal 
Marine Corps 
1. Strategic forces 
2. 0.005Y.x Central suppl y & maint 
3. 0.005Y.x Training 
4. 0.005/.x Administration 
Marine Corps Subtotal 
STRATEGIC OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE 
96,100.000 
100,264.116 
59,235.154 
15,647.881 
271 ' 24 7 . 151 
247,686.000 
260,247 .260 
69,363.405 
27,242.322 
604,538 .987 
1,008,183. 000 
1,116,854.681 
331,022.483 
90' 541. 379 
2,546,601.543 
10.000 
6.418 
2. 062 
1.337 
19.817 
3,422 , 407 .498 
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PROCUREMENT 
<Strategic percentage applied to support or maintenance procurement 
line items is found by dividing expenditures for strategic 
procurement by expenditures for total procurement.> 
Army 
1. Other missiles 
2. O.OOOY.x Modification of missiles 
3. O.OOOY.x Spares and repair 
4. O.OOOY.x Support equipment 
Army Subtotal 
Navy 
1. Ballistic missiles 
2. Fleet ballistic miss il e ships 
3. 16.591Y.x Ship support equipment 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
4. 16.591Y.x Commun & electronic equip 
549,300.000 
382,000.000 
85,277.740 
48, 150 .068 
71,527.949 5. 16.591Y.x Ordnance support equip 
6. 16.591Y.x Supply support equipment 
7. 16.591Y.x Command support equip 
8. 65.487Y.x Modification of missiles 
9. 65.487Y.x Spares and repairs 
10 . 65.487Y.x Support Equipment 
Navy Subtotal 
Air Force 
1. Ballistic missiles 
2. 82.646Y.x Modi~ication of missiles 
3. 82.646Y.x Spares and repair 
4. 82.646Y.x Other support 
Air Force Subtotal 
Marine Corps 
J. Guided missiles & equipment 
Marine Corps Subtotal 
STRATEGIC PROCUREMENT 
1 ,095 .006 
8,642.750 
19,089.461 
14' 276. 166 
7,993.998 
1 ,187,353.138 
587,200.000 
99,257.846 
39,422.142 
508,768.776 
1,234,648.764 
1,900.000 
1,900.000 
2,423,901.902 
<Strategic percentage is found by dividing expenditures for strategic 
RDT&E by expenditures for total RDT~E.> 
1. 50Y.x Missiles & related equip 
2. Military astronautics 
3. 22.600Y.x Program mgmt ~ support 
STRATEGIC RDT&E 
1,005,450.000 
467,194.000 
122,754.386 
1,595,398.386 
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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 
1. Naval reactor development 168,775.000 
829,260.000 
1 72' 121 . 000 
2 . Weapons 
3. Special materials production 
4 . Nuclear security & safeguards 6,276.000 
CAPITAL INVESTMENT: 
5 . Naval reactor dev 
6 . Weapons 
7. Special materials production 
57,316.589 
180,498.000 
36,349.948 
STRATEGIC DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 1,450,596.537 
1. Space and nuclear research tech 0.000 
STRATEGIC NASA 0. 000 
PERSONNEL 2,621,137 . 861 
0 & M 3,422,407.498 
PROCUREMENT 2,423,901.902 
RDT&E 1,595,398.386 
ENERGY 1,450,596.537 
NASA 0.000 
1971 STRATEGIC 11,513,442.184 
PERSONNEL 
<Strategic percentage is found by di viding expenditures for strategic 
personnel forces by total expenditures for personnel forces.> 
Army 
1. Strategic forces 
2. 1.608%x Research & development 
3. 1.608%x Central supply & maint 
4. 1.608%x Training 
5. 1.608%x Administration 
Army Subtotal 
Navy 
1. Strategic forces 
2. 5.486Y.x Research & development 
3. 5.486Y.x Central supply & maint 
4. 5.486Y.x Training 
5. 5.486Y.x Administration 
Navy Subtotal 
Air Force 
1. Strateg ic forces 
2. 45.004Y.x Research & development 
3. 45.004%x Central supply & maint 
4. 45.004Y.x Training 
5. 45.004Y.x Administration 
Air Force Subtotal 
Marine Corps 
l. Strategic forces 
2. 0.108Y.x Research & development 
3. 0.108Y.x Central supply ~ maint 
4 . 0 .1 08Y.x Training 
5. 0.108Y.x Administration 
· Marine Corps Subtotal 
STRATEGIC PERSONNEL 
62,093.000 
1,264.869 
1,943.364 
48,289.253 
2,039.346 
115 ,629.832 
147,391 .000 
3 ,756.648 
6,408.635 
86,010.495 
4,907.940 
248,474.718 
1,473 ,791.000 
90,337.429 
44,953.145 
803,436 . 160 
97,089 . 379 
2,509,607 .11 3 
889.000 
0.606 
19.472 
517.695 
55.854 
1 , 482.627 
2,875,194.290 
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OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE 
<Strategic percentage is found by dividing expenditures for strategic 
f ·rces by expenditures for total forces.) 
Army 
1. Strategic forces 
2. 5.636Y.x Central supply & maint 
3. 5.636%x Training 
4. 5.636%x Administration 
Army Subtotal 
Navy 
1. Strategic forces 
2. 14.344%x Central supply & maint 
3. 14.344%x Training 
4. 14 . 344%x Administration 
Navy Subtotal 
Air Force 
1 . Strategic forces 
2. 51.701Y.x Central supply & maint 
3. 51.701%x Training 
4. 51 . 701Y.x Administration 
Air Force Subtotal 
Marine Corps 
1. Strategic forces 
2. 0.003%x Central supply & maint 
3. 0.003%x Training 
4. 0.003Y.x Administration 
Marine Corps Subtotal 
STRATEGIC OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE 
111,803.000 
117,735 . 476 
76,030.993 
21, 160. 926 
326,730.395 
276,380.000 
271,759.416 
89,997.842 
24,982.945 
663,120.203 
1,038,734.000 
1,188,244.600 
399,912.922 
99,742 . 603 
2,726,634.125 
6.000 
2.664 
1.550 
0.763 
10.977 
3,716,495.700 
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PROCUREMENT 
<Strategic percentage applied to support or maintenance procurement 
line items is found by dividing expenditures for strategic 
procurement by expenditures fo : total procurement. > 
Army 
1. Other missiles 
2. 67 . 747Y.x Modification of missiles 
3 . 67.7471.x Spares and repair 
4 . 67.747Y.x Support equipment 
Army Subtotal 
Navy 
1. Ballistic missiles 
2. Fleet ballistic missile ships 
3. 11.345Y.x Ship support equipment 
4. 11.345%x Commun & electronic equip 
5. 11.345Y.x Ordnance support equip 
6. 11.3451.x Supply support equipment 
7. 11 . 345Y.x Command support equip 
8. 57.434%x Modification of missiles 
9 . 57.434Y.x Spares and repairs 
10. 57.434Y.x Support Equipment 
Navy Subtotal 
Air Force 
1. Ballistic missiles 
2. 69.876Y.x Modification of missiles 
3. 69.876Y.x Spares and repair 
4. 69.8761.x Other support 
Air Force Subtotal 
Marine Corps 
1. Guided missiles & equipment 
Marine Corps Subtotal 
STRATEGIC PROCUREMENT 
612,500.000 
26,827.812 
31,841.090 
28,860.222 
700,029 . 124 
363,169.000 
391 ,528.000 
57,532.424 
39,957.090 
50,086.133 
748.657 
3,596.932 
11,759.612 
1 7 ' 91 1 • 31-7 
6,981.529 
943,270.744 
741, 100.000 
37,593.288 
30,465.936 
367,338.132 
1,176,547.356 
1, 100. 000 
1,100.000 
2,820,947.224 
<Strategic percentage is found by dividing e xpenditures for strategic 
RDT&E by expenditures for total RDT&E.l 
J . 50Y.x Missiles & related equip 
2. Military astronautics 
3. 19.305Y.x Program mgmt & support 
STRATEGIC RDT&E 
972,850.000 
404,723.000 
111,235.989 
1,488,808.989 
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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 
1. Naval reactor development 158,239.000 
842,846.000 
142,840.000 
2. Weapons 
3. Special materials production 
4. Nuclear security & safeguards 4,909.000 
4,742.000 5. Was te management 
CAPITAL INVESTMENT: 
5 . Naval reactor dev 
6. Weapons 
7. Special materials production 
87,660.000 
172,257.000 
44,034.609 
STRATEGIC DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 1,457,527.609 
1. Space and nuclear research tech 102 1 975.000 
STRATEGIC NASA 102 ,975.000 
PERSONNEL 2,875,194.290 
0 & M 3,716,495.700 
PROCUREMENT 2,820,947.224 
RDT&E l,488,808.989 
ENERGY 1,457,527.609 
NASA 102 ,97~.ooo 
1972 STRATEGIC 12,461 , 948.812 
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PERSONNEL 
<Strategic percentage is found by dividing expenditures for strategic 
personnel forces by total e xpenditures for personnel forces. ) 
Army 
1. Strategic forces 
2. 1.563%x Research & development 
3. 1.563%x Central supply & maint 
4. 1.563%x Training 
5. 1.563%x Administration 
Army Subtotal 
Navy 
1. Strategic forces 
2. 5.547Y.x Research & development 
3. 5.547%x Central suppl y & maint 
4. 5.547%x Training 
5. 5.547Y.x Administration 
Navy Subtotal 
Air Force 
1. Strategic forces 
2. 46.5761.x Research & development 
3. 46.5761.x Central suppl y & maint 
4. 46.5761.x Training 
5. 46.5761.x Administration 
Air Force Subtota l 
Marine Corps 
1. Strategic forces 
2 . 0.0001.x Research & development 
3. 0.000%x Central suppl y & maint 
4. 0.0.00x Training 
5. O.OOOY.x Administration 
Marine Corps Subtotal 
STRATEGIC PERSONNEL 
58,825.000 
1,254.589 
1,912.112 
42,620.775 
2,308.614 
106,921.090 
162,990.000 
4,018.247 
6,562.046 
94,158.772 
4,712.010 
272,441.075 
1,582,014.000 
100,609.919 
56,112.562 
926,683.425 
106,506.964 
2, 771,926.870 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
o.ooo 
3' 151 '289. 035 
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OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE 
<Strategic percentage is found by dividing e xpend itures for strategi c 
forces by expenditures for total forces. ) 
Army 
1. Strategic forces 
2. 6.012Y.x Central suppl y & maint 
3. 6.012Y.x Training 
4. 6 . 012Y.x Administration 
5. Supplement request 
Army Subtotal 
Na vy 
1. Strategic forces 
2. 15.lSO'l.x Central supply~ maint 
3 . 15.150'l.x Training 
4. 15.150Y.x Administrati on 
5. Supplement request 
Navy Subtotal 
Air Force 
1. Strategic forces 
2. 54.572Y.x Central suppl y & maint 
3. 54.572Y.x Training 
4. 54.572'l.x Administration 
5. Supplement request 
Air Force Subtotal 
Marine Corps 
1. Strategic forces 
2. O. OOOY.x Central suppl y & maint 
3. O.OOO'l.x Training 
4. O.OOO'l.x Administration 
Marine Corps Subtotal 
Defense Agencies 
109 , 742 . 000 
128 ' 957 . 160 
89,840 .623 
22,976.662 
637.272 
352 ' 1 53 . 7 1 7 
321,676.000 
311,017.532 
110,447.742 
26,077.695 
893.850 
770,112 .81 9 
1,140,281.000 
1,299' 193 . 421 
454,560 .748 
110 ' 083 • 184 
18,117 . 904 
3,022,236.257 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
1. Nuclear defense agency 10,970.000 
Defense Agencies Subtotal 10,970.000 
STRATEGIC OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE 4 , 155,472.793 
70 
PROCUREMENT 
<Strategic percentage applied to support or maintenance procurement 
line items is found by dividing expenditures for strategic 
procurement by expenditures for total procurement.) 
Army 
1. Other missiles 
2. 46.642%x Modification of missiles 
3. 46.642%x Spares and repair 
4. 46.642%x Support equipment 
Army Subtotal 
Navy 
1. Ballistic missiles 
2. Fleet ballistic missile ships 
3. 15 . 491%x Ship support equipment 
285,400.000 
12,919.834 
18,796.726 
9' 141. 832 
326, 258.392 
4. 15 . 491%x Commun & electronic equip 
312,400.000 
718,700 . 000 
87,666.529 
66,373.651 
96,980.226 5. 15.491Y.x Ordnance support equ ip 
6. 15.491%x Supply support equipment 
7 . 15.491%x Command support equ ip 
8. 50.088%x Modification of missiles 
9 . 50.088%x Spares and repairs 
10. 50.088%x Support Equipment 
Navy Subtotal 
Air Force 
1. Ballistic missiles 
2. 66.861%x Modification of missiles 
3. 66.861Xx Spares and repair 
4. 66.861%x Other support 
Air Force Subtotal 
Marine Corps 
1. Guided missiles & equipment 
Marine Corps Subtotal 
STRATEGIC PROCUREMENT 
1,425.724 
6,938.007 
6,811.968 
6,912.144 
22,339.248 
1,326,547.497 
663,600.000 
24,671. 709 
28,014.759 
411 '262 . 01 l 
1, 127 ,548.479 
22,100.000 
22,100.000 
2,802,454.368 
<Strategic percentage is found by dividing expenditures for strategic 
ROT&E by expenditures for total RDT&E.) 
1. 50%x Missiles & related equip 
2. Military astronautics 
3. 19.696%x Program mgmt ~ support 
STRATEGIC RDT&E 
1 ' 04 7 ' 641 . 500 
407,889.000 
123,964.654 
1 '579' 495. 154 
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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 
1. Naval reactor development 149,800.000 
867, 729 .000 
143,947.000 
2. Weapons 
3. Special materials production 
4. Nuclear security & safeguards 1,565.000 
7,400.000 
88,929.964 
5. Nuclear waste management 
6. 52.6301.x Program support 
CAPITAL INVESTMENT: 
7. Naval reactor dev 
8. Weapons 
9. Program support 
16,825.000 
129,877.000 
2,701.391 
STRATEGIC DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 1,408,774.355 
1. Space and nuclear research tech 82,260.000 
STRATEGIC NASA 82 , 260.000 
PERSONNEL 3,151,289.035 
0 ~ M 4,155,472.793 
PROCUREMENT 2,802,454.368 
RDT&E 1,579,495.154 
ENERGY 1,408, 774 .355 
NASA 82,260.000 
1973 STRATEGIC 13,179,745.705 
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PERSONNEL 
<Strategic percentage is found by dividing expenditures for strategic 
personnel forces by total expenditures for personnel forces.) 
Army 
1. Strategic forces 
2. l.415%x Research & development 
3. 1.415%x Central suppl y & maint 
4. l.415%x Training 
5. 1.415%x Administration 
6. Supplement request 
Army Subtotal 
Navy 
1. Strategic forces 
2. 5.865%x Research & development 
3. 5.865%x Central suppl y & maint 
4. 5.865%x Training 
5. 5.865%x Administration 
6. Supplement request 
Navy Subtotal 
Air Force 
1. Strategic forces 
2. 48.588%x Research & development 
3 . 48.588%x Centra l supply & maint 
~. 48.588%x Tra ining 
5 . 48.588Y.x Administra tion 
o. Supplement request 
Air Force Subtotal 
Marine Corps 
1. Strategic forces 
2. O. OOOY.x Research & development 
3. 0 . 000Y.x Central supply & maint 
4 . 0.0.00x Training 
5. O. OOOY.x Administration 
Marine Corps Subtotal 
STRATEGIC PERSONNEL 
60,393.000 
1,256.845 
1,671.907 
36,384.475 
2,033.567 
473.426 
102,213.220 
178,309 .000 
4,201.686 
7,282.629 
112,391.523 
5 ,537.205 
1,448.316 
309,170.359 
1,628,382.000 
105,639.058 
61'956. 988 
1,084,757.225 
108.103 .441 
20.507 . 457 
3 , 009,346.169 
0 . 000 
0 .000 
0 . 000 
0.000 
u.ooo 
0 . 000 
3,420,729 . 748 
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OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE 
<Str ategi c percentage is found by di v iding expenditures for strategic 
forces by expenditures for tot~l forces . > 
Army 
1 . Strategic forces 
2 . 5.6211.x Central suppl y & ma1nt 
3. 5.6211.x Training 
4. 5.6211.x Administration 
5 . Supplement request 
Army Subtota l 
Navy 
1. Strategic forces 
2. 12 . 4331.x Central suppl y & maint 
3. 12 . 433'l.x Training 
4 . 12.433'l.x Administration 
5 . Supplement request 
Navy Subtotal 
Air Force 
1. Strategic for ces 
2 . 52.619'l.x Central supply & maint 
3. 52.619'l.x Training 
4 . 52.6191.x Administration 
5. Supplement request 
Air Force Subtotal 
Marine Corps 
1. Strategic forces 
2. 0 . 0001.x Central suppl y & maint 
3 . O. OOO'l.x Training 
4 . 0 . 0001.x Administration 
Marine Corps Subtota l 
Def ense Agencies 
101'464 . 000 
106,694 . 787 
99,332 . 007 
19,623 . 41 7 
9,014.459 
336,158 . 670 
340,898 . 000 
263,228. 741 
102,456.126 
32, 197 . 118 
20,991 .11 3 
759 • 771 . 098 
l ,126 ,924 . 000 
1 ,252 , 674 . 224 
506,389 .470 
11 9, 7 11 . 908 
145,207 . 251 
3,150 , 906 . 853 
0 . 000 
0 . 000 
0 . 000 
0 .000 
0 . 000 
l . Nuclear defense agency 19,297 . 000 
Defense Agencies Subtotal 19 ,297 . 000 
STRATEGIC OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE 4 , 266 . 133 . 621 
PROCUREMENT 
<Strategic percent age app lied to support or ma intenance procurement 
line items is found by dividing e xpend itures fo r strategic 
procurement by e xpend i tures for total procurement. ) 
Army 
1. Other missiles 
2 . 31.464Y.x Modification of missiles 
3. 31.464Y.x Spares and repair 
4. 3 1 . 464Y.x Support equipment 
Army Subtotal 
Na vy 
1. Ballistic missiles 
2. Fleet ba llistic missile ships 
3 . 13.974Y.x Ship support equ ipment 
159 ,300.000 
3,744 .216 
5,757 . 912 
6,48 1.584 
175,283.712 
4 . 13 . 974Y.x Commun & electronic equip 
253 , 400 . 000 
779,500 . 000 
43,799 . 267 
54,344.886 
33,188 . 250 5. 13.974Y.x Ordnance suppor t equ ip 
6 . 13 . 974Y.x Supply support equ ipment 
7. 13 . 974Y.x Command support equip 
8. Supp l ement request 
9 . Supplement missile ships 
Na vy Subtotal 
Air Force 
1 . Ballistic missiles 
2. 73 .277Y.x Modification of missiles 
3. 73.277Y.x Spares and repa ir 
4. 73.277Y.x Other support 
Air Force Subtota l 
Marine Corps 
1. Guided missiles & equ ipment 
2. Supp l emen t request 
Marine Corps Subtotal 
STRATEGIC PROCUREMENT 
1,704.828 
7,308.402 
14,253.480 
24,800 . 000 
1 '212' 299 . 113 
621 ' 900 . 000 
31, 509 .11 0 
26,672 . 828 
362,867.704 
1,042,949 . 642 
32,600 . 000 
22 . 300.000 
54,900.000 
2,485,432.467 
<S tra t egi c percentage is found by dividing e xpenditures for strategic 
RDT&E by expenditures for total RDT&E .J 
1. 50Y.x Miss iles & r elated equip 
2 . Military ast ronaut ics 
3 . 21 . 775Y.x Program mgmt & support 
STRATEGIC RDT&E 
1 ' 062 ' 381 . 000 
593,926 . 000 
158,193 . 633 
J,814,500 . 633 
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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 
1. Naval r e actor development 154,200.000 
835,580. 000 
161,845. 000 
2. Weapon c. 
3. Special ma terials production 
4. 48.425Y.x Program support 80,467.823 
CAPITAL INVESTMENT : 
5. Naval reactor dev 
o. Weapons 
7 . Specia l mater i als production 
64,097. 000 
152,682. 000 
7 1,386.561 
7,875 . 000 
3,405.907 
8. Nuclear materials security 
9. Program support 
STRATEGIC DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 1,531,539.291 
NASA 
1. Space and nuclear research tech 0 . 000 
STRATEGIC NASA 0 . 000 
PERSONNEL 3,420, 729.748 
0 & M 4, 230 ,377 .11 4 
PROCUREMENT 2,485,432.467 
RDT&E 1 , 814,500.633 
ENERGY 1,531,539.291 
NASA 0 . 000 
1974 STRATEGIC 13,482,579.253 
7o 
PERSONNEL 
<S trategic percentage is found by dividing expenditures for strategic 
personnel forces by total expenditures for personnel forces . > 
Army 
1. Strategic forces 
2. 0 . 565Y.x Research & development 
3. 0.565Y.x Central suppl y & maint 
4. 0 .5651.x Training 
5. 0 .565Y.x n~m1nistration 
6. Supplement request 
Army Subtotal 
Navy 
1. Strategic forces 
2 . 6.070Y.x Research & development 
3. 6.070Xx Central supply & maint 
4. 6 .070Y.x Training 
5. 6.070Y.x Administration 
Navy Subtotal 
Air Force 
1. Strategic forces 
2 . 48.320Y.x Research & development 
3. 48.3201.x Central suppl y & maint 
4 . 48.320'l.x Training 
5. 48.320'l.x Administration 
6 . Supplement request 
Air Force Subtotal 
Marine Corps 
1. Strategic forces 
2 . O. OOO'l.x Research & development 
3. O. OOO'l.x Centra l suppl y & ma int 
4. O. OOOY.x Training 
5 . O. OOOY.x Administration 
Marine Corps Subtotal 
STRATEGIC PERSONNEL 
25,087.000 
504 . 528 
560 .531 
15,87 1.630 
063.807 
1011. 171 
42,791 . 667 
188,650.000 
4,367.911 
7 ,234.347 
121,221 .421 
5,841.161 
327,314.840 
1,639,626 .000 
112,932.054 
61,526.822 
1 ,070,546 . 995 
105,702.41 6 
4,411.379 
2,994,745 . 666 
0 . 000 
0 . 000 
0 . 000 
0.000 
0.000 
0 . 000 
3,364 ,852 .1 73 
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OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE 
<Str ategic percentage is found by dividi ng expenditures for strategic 
forces by e xpenditures for total forces.) 
Army 
! . Strategic forces 
2. 4.333'l.x Central suppl y & main t 
3. 4.333Y.x Tra ining 
4. 4.333Y.x Adm ini stration 
Army Subtotal 
Navy 
1. Strateg i c forces 
2. ! 3 .375'l.x Central suppl y & maint 
3. 13.375'l.x Training 
4. 13.375Y.x Administration 
Navy Subtotal 
Air Force 
1. Strategic forces 
2. 53 428Y.x Central supply & maint 
3. 53.428Y.x Training 
4. 53.428Y.x Administration 
Air Force Subtota l 
Marine Corps 
1. Strategic forces 
2. O. OOOY.x Central suppl y & ma i nt 
3. O.OOOY.x Training 
4. O.OOOY.x Administration 
Marine Corps Subtotal 
Defense Agencies 
89,386.000 
81,979.840 
70,750.047 
20,549 . 296 
262 '665 . 183 
490,230.000 
305,928.248 
100,832.386 
30,897.855 
927 , 888. 489 
1 ,517, 116. 000 
1 ,353 ,945. 662 
448,100.636 
137 ,466.504 
3,456,628.802 
o.ooo 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0 . 000 
1. Defense nuclear agenc y 22 ,034 . 000 
Defense Agenc i es Subtotal 22,034.000 
STRATEGIC OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE 4,669 , 216 . 474 
78 
PROCUREMENT 
<Strategic percentage applied to suppor t or maintenance procurement 
li ne items is found by dividing e xpenditures for strategic 
procurement by ex~~nditures for total procurement . > 
Army 
1. Other missiles 
2. O.OOOY.x Modification of missiles 
0 . 000 
0.000 
0.000 
0 . 000 
3. O.OOOY.x Spares and repair 
4. O. OOOY.x Support equ ipment 
Army Subtotal 
Navy 
1. Ballistic missiles 
2. Fleet ballistic missile ships 
3. 21.060Y.x Ship support equipment 
0 . 000 
78,300.000 
1, 330,700.000 
75,858 . 120 
110,375.460 
60,421.140 
4. 21.060Y.x Commun & electronic equ ip 
5. 21 . 060Y.x Ordnance support equip 
6. 21 . 060Y.x Supply support equipment 2,232.360 
16,174.080 
1,674,061.160 
7. 21.060Y.x Command support equip 
Navy Subtotal 
Air Force 
1. Balli stic missiles 
2. 81.744Y.x Modif ication of missil es 
597,300.000 
33,433.296 
35,395.152 
594,932 .832 
1,261,061 . 280 
3. 81 . 744Y. x Spares and repai r 
4 . 81.744%x Other support 
Air Force Subtotal 
Marine Corps 
1. Guided missiles & equipment 
Marine Corps Subtotal 
STRATEGIC PROCUREMENT 
77, 600 .000 
77,600 . 000 
3,012,722.440 
<S trategic percentage is found by dividing e xpendi t ures for s trategi c 
RDT~E by e xpenditures for total RDT&E. > 
1. 50Y.x Missiles & re lated equip 
2 . Military astronautics 
3. 20 . 612Y.x Program mgmt & support 
STRATEGIC RDT&E 
1, 053 , 767.000 
523,757.000 
198,301 .456 
1, 775,825.456 
79 
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 
1. Naval reactor development 167,000.000 
819 , 997.000 
188,827.000 
2. Weapons 
3. Special materials production 
4 . Nuclear secur ity & safeguards 5,863.000 
41 , 400.000 5. Laser fusion 
CAPITAL INVESTMENT: 
5. Naval reactor dev 
6. Weapons 
7. Special materials production 
19 ,201.000 
179 , 826. 000 
262,367.000 
4' 175.000 
20,714.000 
8. Nuclear materials security 
9. Laser fusion 
STRATEGIC DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 1,709,370.000 
1. Space and nuclear research tech 0.000 
STRATEGIC NASA 0.000 
PERSONNEL 3 , 364,852.173 
0 & M 4,669,216.474 
PROCUREMENT 3,012,722.440 
RDT&E 1 1 775,825.456 
ENERGY 1,709,370 .000 
NASA 0.000 
1975 STRATEGIC 14,531,986 . 543 
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PERSONNEL 
<Strategic percentage is found by dividing expenditures for strategic 
personnel forces by total expenditures for personnel forces.) 
Army 
1. Strategic forces 
2. 0.213%x Research & development 
3. 0.213'l.x Central suppl y & maint 
4. 0.213%x Training 
5. 0.213'l.x Administration 
Army Sub total 
Navy 
J. Strategic forces 
2 . 6.261Y.x Research & development 
3. 6.261 Y.x Central suppl y & maint 
4. 6.261'l.x Tr aining 
5. 6.261Y.x Administration 
Navy Subtotal 
Air Force 
1. Strategic forces 
2. 48 .556Y.x Research & development 
3. 48.556 Y.x Central suppl y & maint 
4. 48.556%x Training 
5. 48 .556%x Administration 
Air Force Subtotal 
Marine Corps 
1. Strategic forces 
2. 0.000%x Research & development 
3. O.OOOY.x Central suppl y & maint 
4. O. OOO'l.x Training 
5. 0.000%x Administration 
Marine Corps Subtotal 
STRATEGIC PERSONNEL 
J0,302. 000 
191.078 
211.011 
6,010.743 
238.564 
196,954.000 
4,757.671 
7 ,432.183 
126,481 .967 
16,953.396 
5,824.921 
341,450.742 
1,577,787.000 
117,879 . 401 
57, 74 1.339 
1,125,676.661 
109 ' 80 l . 625 
2,988,886.026 
0.000 
0 .000 
0.000 
0 . 000 
0.000 
0.000 
3,347,290.164 
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<Strategic percentage is found by dividing e xpenditures for strategic 
forces by e xpenditures for total forces . > 
Army 
1. Strategic forces 
2. 3.489%x Central supply & maint 
3. 3.489Y.x Training 
4. 3.489Y.x Administration 
Army Subtotal 
Navy 
1. Strategic forces 
2. 14.003Y.x Central suppl y & maint 
3. 14.003Y.x Training 
4. 14.003Y.x Administration 
Navy Subtotal 
Air Force 
1. Strategic forces 
2. 54.137Y.x Central supply & maint 
3. 54.137%x Training 
4. 54.137%x Administration 
Air Force Subtotal 
Marine Corps 
1. Strategic forces 
2 . 0 . 000%x Central supply & maint 
3. O.OOOY.x Tra ining 
4. O. OOOY.x Administration 
Marine Corps Subtotal 
Defense Agencies 
85,656.000 
74,647.713 
59,267.678 
16,967.042 
236,538.433 
601,842.000 
356,999.344 
111,021.665 
35,086.897 
1,104,949.906 
1 ' 543' 179. 000 
1,430,999.531 
476,628.103 
150,354.690 
3 , 601 , 161.324 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
1. Defense nuclear agency 22,674.000 
Defense Agencies Subtotal 22 , 674.000 
STRATEGIC OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE 4,965,323.663 
82 
PROCUREMENT 
<Strategic percentage applied to support or maintenance procurement 
line items is found by dividing expenditures for strateg i c 
procurement by expenditures for total procurement. l 
Army 
1 . Other missiles 
2. O.OOOY.x Modifi cation of missiles 
0 . 000 
0 . 000 
0 .000 
0 . 000 
3. O. OOOY.x Spares and repair 
4 . O. OOOY.x Support equipment 
Army Subtotal 
Navy 
1. Ballistic missiles 
2. Fleet ballist i c missile ships 
3. 11.371Y.x Ship support equipment 
0 . 000 
4 . 11.371Y.x Commun & e lectronic equip 
270,000. 000 
647 , 500 . 000 
44,773.313 
63,552.519 
44,073.996 5 . 11 . 371Y.x Ordnance support equip 
6. 11 . 371Y.x Supply support equipment 
7. 11 . 371Y.x Command support equip 
Navy Subtotal 
Air Force 
1. Ba llistic missiles 
2,046.780 
8,334.943 
1, 080 ,281.551 
2. 68 . 818Y.x Modification of missiles 
6 77' 100. 000 
31,381. 008 
43,424 .158 
426 , 396. 328 
3. 68 . 818Y.x Spares and repair 
4. 68.818Y.x Other support 
Air Force Subtotal 
Marine Corps 
1. Guided missiles~ equipment 
Marine Corps Subtota l 
STRATEGIC PROCUREMENT 
1 ' 1 78' 30 1 . 494 
55 ,000 . 000 
55, 000 . 000 
2, 313 , 583. 045 
<Strategic percentage is found by di v iding e xpend i tures f or s trateg i c 
RDT&E by e xpenditures for total RDT&E. l 
1. 50Y.x Missiles & related equip 
2. Militar y astronautics 
3. 20.268Y.x Program mgmt & support 
STRATEGI C RDT&E 
1,139 , 685.500 
583,592. 000 
207 ,866 . 987 
1, 931,1 44. 487 
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 
1. Naval reactor development 
2 . Weapons 
3. Special materials production 
4. Nuclear security ~ safeguards 
5. 35 . 9441.x Program support 
CAPITAL INVESTMENT : 
6 . Naval reactor dev 
7. Weapons 
8 . Special materials production 
9. Nuclear materials security 
10. Program support 
STRATEGIC DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 
83 
186,200 . 000 
249,630 . 000 
267,692.000 
11,975 . 000 
85 ,080. 167 
14,700.000 
164 ,376 . 000 
104,279.000 
6,020.000 
6,046.991 
1,695,999.158 
1. Space and nuclear research tech 0 . 000 
STRATEGIC NASA 0.000 
PERSONNEL 3,347,290 .1 64 
0 ~ M 4,965,323.663 
PROCUREMENT 2,313,583.045 
RDT~E 1,931,144.487 
ENERGY 1,695,999.158 
NASA 0 . 000 
1976 STRATEGI C 14,253,340.517 
84 
PERSONNEL 
<Strategic percentage is found by dividing expenditures for strategic 
personnel forces by total expenditures for personnel forces.> 
Ar my 
1. Str a tegic forces 
2. 0 . 054Y.x Research & development 
3 . 0.054Y.x Central suppl y & maint 
4. 0.054Y.x Training 
5. 0.054Y.x Administration 
Army Subtotal 
Navy 
1. Stra tegic forces 
2. 6.526Y.x Research & development 
3. 6.526Y.x Central supply & maint 
4. 6 . 526Y.x Training 
5. 6. 526Y.x Administra tion 
Navy Subtotal 
Air Force 
1. Stra t egic forces 
2. 46 . 989Y.x Research & development 
3. 46 . 989Y.x Central suppl y & ma int 
4. 46.989Y.x Training 
5. 46 . 989Y.x Administra tion 
Air Force Subtotal 
Marine Corps 
J . Str a tegic forces 
2 . O. OOOY.x Research & development 
3. O.OOOY.x Central supply & maint 
4. O.OOOY.x Training 
5 . O. OOOY.x Administration 
Marine Corps Subtotal 
STRATEGIC PERSONNEL 
2,825 . 000 
46 . 370 
55.546 
1,568.926 
60.018 
216,977.000 
4,892.673 
7 ,971 .509 
134,117.784 
4,555.860 
7,696.242 
371,655.208 
1,500,088.000 
117,566.948 
59,437.796 
1,026,907.474 
93,864.287 
2,797,864.505 
0 .000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0 . 000 
0 . 000 
3,174,075.573 
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<Strategic percentage is found by di vi ding e xpenditures for strategic 
forces by expend i t.ures for total forces . ) 
Army 
1. Strategic forces 
2. 0.997Y.x Central supply & maint 
3. 0.997Y.x Training 
4. 0.997Y.x Administration 
Army Subtotal 
Navy 
1. Strategic forces 
2. 16 . 263Y.x Central suppl y & maint 
3 . 16.263Y.x Training 
4. 16 . 263Y.x Administration 
Navy Subtotal 
Air Force 
1. Strategic forces 
2. 51 . 231Y.x Central suppl y & maint 
3. 51.231Y.x Training 
4. 51.231Y.x Administration 
Air Force Subtotal 
Marine Corps 
1. Strategic forces 
2. O. OOOY.x Central suppl y & maint 
3. O.OOOY.x Training 
4 . O. OOOY.x Administration 
Marine Corps Subtotal 
Defense Agencies 
26,321.000 
24 ,661 . 623 
19,258.311 
5' 110. 732 
75,351.666 
853,223. 000 
459,821.526 
141,071.279 
44,028.820 
1,498, 144.625 
1,569,355.000 
1,483,135.401 
466,271.262 
115,584.308 
3 , 634,345.971 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0 . 000 
0 .000 
1. Defense nuclear agenc y 24,883.000 
Defense Agency Subtotal 24,883. 000 
STRATEGIC OPERATION ANO MAINTENANCE 5,232, 725.262 
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PROCUREMENT 
<Strategic percentage applied to support or maintenance procurement 
line items is found by di v iding e xpenditures ~~r strategic 
procurement by e xpenditures for total procurement. > 
Army 
1. Other missiles 
2. O. OOO 'l.x Modification of missiles 
3. O.OOO'l.x Spares and repair 
4 . O.OOO'l.x Support equipment 
Army Subtotal 
Navy 
1. Ball istic missiles 
2. Fleet ballistic missile ships 
3. 16 . 7991.x Ship support equipment 
0.000 
0 .000 
0 . 000 
0 . 000 
1,075,300.000 
794 ,400 . 000 
85,117.845 
0 . 000 
4. 16.799'l.x Commun & elec tronic equip 105 , 918 . 87 1 
73,429.269 
10 ,535.493 
15,248.116 
5. 16.7991.x Ordnance support equip 
6. 16.7991.x Supply support equipment 
7 . 16 . 7991.x Command support equip 
Navy Subtotal 
Air Force 
1. Ballistic missiles 
2,159,949 . 594 
654,800 . 000 
2. 68.386'l. x Modification of missiles 36, 107 . 808 
58,1 96.486 
525,614.796 
1,274,719 . 090 
3. 68 . 386'l.x Spares and repair 
4 . 68 . 386'l.x Other support 
Air Force Subtotal 
Marine Corps 
1. Guided missiles & equipment 
Marine Corps Subtotal 
STRATEGIC PROCUREMENT 
61'700 . 000 
61,700.000 
::. .496,368.684 
<Str ateg ic percentage is found by di vi ding e xpenditures for strategic 
RDT&E by e xpend itur es for total RDT&E.) 
1 . Strategic programs 
2. 50'l.x Advance t echn development 
3. 27.BOl'l.x Program mgmt & support 
STRATEGIC RDT&E 
2,235,487.000 
317,977 . 000 
392,253.761 
2,945,717.761 
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 
1. Naval reactor development 
2. Weapons 
3. Special materials production 
4 . Nuclear safeguards & securit y 
5. 38 .5571.x Program support 
CAPITAL INVESTMENT: 
7. Naval reactor dev 
8 . Weapons 
9. Special materials production 
10 . Nuclear materials securi ty 
11 . Program support 
STRATEGIC DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 
87 
202,600 . 000 
966,305. 000 
336,636. 000 
23,640 . 000 
120,649.865 
24,422. 000 
205,827 . 000 
195, 758. 000 
4,376 . 000 
6,513.381 
2, 086 , 727 . 24 6 
I. Space and nuclear researc h tech 0 . 000 
STRATEGIC NASA 0 . 000 
PE RSONNEL 3 ,1 74 , 075 . 573 
0 & M 5, 232 , 725 . 262 
PROCUREMENT 3, 496,368. 68~ 
RDT&E 2 , 945 , 7 17.76 1 
ENERGY 2 , 086 , 727 . 246 
NASA 0 . 000 
1977 STRATEGI C 16 , 935 . 6 14 . 526 
8b 
PERSONNEL 
iStrategi c percentage is found by dividing e xpenditures for strategic 
personnel for ces by total e xpendi t ures for personne l forces . 1 
Mmy 
1. Strategic f orce s 
2. 0 . 003Y.x Research & deve l opment 
3 . 0.003Y.x Central supp ly & maint 
4 . 0 . 003Y.x Training 
5 . 0 . 003Y.x Administration 
Army Sub t o t a l 
Na vy 
l. Strategic forces 
2 . 6 . 773Y.x Research & development 
3. 6.773Y.x Central suppl y & maint 
4. 6.773Y.x Training 
5 . 6.773Y.x Administration 
Navy Sub total 
Air Force 
1 . Strategic forc es 
2 . 45 . 556Y.x Research & developmen t 
3 . 45 . 556Y.x Central supply & maint 
4 . 45.556Y.x Training 
5. 45 .556Y.x Administrat i on 
Air Force Subtota l 
Marine Corps 
l . Str ateg i c forces 
2 . O. OOOY.x Research & development 
3 . O.OOOY.x Central supply & maint 
4 . O. OOOXx Tra1n1ng 
5 . O. OOOY.x Administration 
Marine Corps Sub tot al 
STRATEGI C PERSONNEL 
162.000 
2 . 744 
3 . 147 
82 . 3 1"0 
3 .650 
231,480.000 
5, 331 . 096 
9' 19 1 . 774 
150 ,283 . 117 
8,~09 . 116 
253 . 851 
404 . 595. 103 
1,564,31 9.000 
118. 069. 307 
62,529.710 
96 1. 808 . 339 
79,483 .375 
2,786,209 . 731 
0 . 000 
0 . 000 
0.000 
0.000 
0 .000 
o.ooo 
3' 19 1 • 058. 773 
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OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE 
<Str ategic percentage is fo und by dividing e xpend itures for strategic 
for ces by e xpend itures for total forces . I 
Army 
1 . Strategic forces 
2 . O. OOO'l.x Central suppl y & maint 
3. O.OOOY.x Training 
4 . O. OOOY.x Administration 
Army Subtotal 
Navy 
1. Strategic forces 
2. 14 . 038'l.x Central suppl y & maint 
3 . 14. 0381.x Training 
4 . 14 . 038'l.x Administration 
Na vy Subtotal 
Air Force 
1. S trategic forces 
2 . 49 . 986Xx Central suppl y & maint 
3 . 49 . 986Xx Training 
4 . 49 . 986Xx Administr a tion 
Air Force Subtotal 
Marine Corps 
1. Strategic forces 
2. O. OOO 'l.x Central suppl y & maint 
3 . O. OOOY.x Training 
4 . O. OOO 'l. x Administr a tion 
Marine Corps Subtotal 
Defense Agencies 
0 . 000 
0 . 000 
0.000 
0 . 000 
822,597. 000 
477,431.819 
128, 765.380 
0 . 000 
45,524 . 532 
1,474,318.731 
1,615 ,367.000 
1,514,295.878 
483,74 1.015 
112,47 1. 499 
3,725 , 875 . 392 
0 . 000 
0 . 000 
0 . 000 
0 . 000 
0 . 000 
J. Defense nuclear agenc y 23 ,467.000 
Defense Agenc y Subto tal 23 ,467 . 000 
STRATEGIC OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE 5,223,661 . 123 
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PROCUREMENT 
<Strategic percentage applied to support or maintenance procurement 
11n~ items is found by dividing e xpenditures fo r strategic 
procurement by expenditures for total procurement . > 
Army 
J. Other mi ssiles 
2 . O. OOOXx Modification of missiles 
0 . 000 
0.000 
0 . 000 
0 . 000 
3 . O.OOOY.x Spares and repair 
4. O. OOOY.x Support equipment 
Army Subtotal 
Navy 
J . Ballist ic missiles 
2. Fleet ballistic miss il e ships 
3. 25.208Xx Shi p support equipment 
1,199,750. 000 
1,703,200. 000 
90 , 0 18. 524 
0 . 000 
4 . 25.208Xx Commun & electronic equip 194,473 . 922 
5 . 25.208Xx Ordnance support equip 
6 . 25.208Xx Supply support equipment 
95, 734 .186 
17,750.213 
30,725 . 779 7 . 25 . 208Xx Command support equip 
Navy S1·btota l 
Air Force 
J . Ballist ic mi ssiles 
3 , 331 , 652 . 624 
2 . 39.912Xx Modificati on of missiles 
263,100. 000 
28, 137.960 
23,029.224 
380,321 . 448 
694,588.632 
3 . 39 .912Xx Spares and repair 
4 . 39 . 9 12Xx Other support 
Air Force Sub total 
Marine Corps 
1. Guided missiles & equipment 
Marine Corps Subtotal 
STRATEGI C PROCUREMENT 
97,200 . 000 
97 ,200 . 000 
4 ' 123' 44 J • 256 
<Strategic percentage is foum.l by dividing expenditures for strategic 
RDT&E by e xpenditures for total RDT&E. l 
J . Strateg i c programs 
2. 50Y.x Advance techn deve lopment 
3 . 27.713Xx Program mgmt & support 
STRATEGIC RDT&E 
2,536, 426 . 000 
243,413 . 000 
382,896 . 942 
3 ,162, 735.942 
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 
1 . Na val reactor development 
2 . Weapons 
3. Intelligence S. arms control 
4. Special materials production 
5. Nuclear safeguards S. security 
CAPITAL INVESTMENT : 
6. Naval reactor dev 
7 . Weapons 
8 . Special materials production 
9 . Nuclear material security 
STRATEGIC DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 
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223,692 . 000 
1, 079,575. 000 
11,662 . 500 
400 , 7 44 . 000 
33,578 . 000 
28,075. 000 
191,314 . 000 
20 2,146 . 000 
3,123 . 000 
2,173,909 . 500 
1. Space and nuclear research tech 0 . 000 
STRATEGIC NASA 0 . 000 
PERSONNEL 3,191 , 058. 773 
0 & M 5,223,66 1.123 
PROCUREMENT 4,123 , 441 . 256 
RDT&E 3, 162, 735. 9 42 
ENERGY 2,1 73 , 909.500 
NASA 0 . 000 
1978 STRATEGIC 17, 874,806.594 
92 
PERSONNEL 
<Strategic percentage is found by d iv id i ng e xpend i tures fo r strat eg ic 
personnel forces by tota l e xpenditures for per sonne l fo rces. > 
Army 
1. Strategic forces 
2. O. OOO'l.x Resear ch & development 
3. O.OOOY. x Central suppl y & ma i nt 
4. O. OOO'l.x Tra i ning 
5 . O.OOO'l.x Admi nistration 
Army Subtotal 
Navy 
1 . Strategic forces 
2 . 6 . 720'l.x Research & development 
3. 6.720Y.x Central suppl y & maint 
4. 6 . 720Y.x Training 
5 . 6.720'l.x Administration 
Navy Subtotal 
Air Force 
1. Strategic f orces 
2. 44.668'l. x Research & development 
3. 44.668'l. x Central suppl y & maint 
4. 44 . 668Y.x Training 
5 . 44 . 668Y.x Admin i strat i on 
Air Force Subtota l 
Marine Corps 
1 . Strategic forces 
2. O. OOOY.x Research & development 
3. O. OOOY.x Cent r al suppl y & maint 
4. O.OOO'l.x Training 
5 . O. OOOY.x Administration 
Marine Corps Subtotal 
STRATEGIC PERSONNEL 
0 . 000 
0.000 
0 . 000 
0 . 000 
0 . 000 
246,250.000 
5,335.411 
9 , 890 .630 
151,726.915 
0 . 000 
8 , 430. 576 
421,633. 532 
1 , 614, 149.000 
122, 628 .73 1 
66,802 .781 
955, 751 . 81 6 
82 , 872 .094 
2,84 1 , 204 . 422 
0.000 
0.000 
0 . 000 
0 . 000 
0.000 
0.000 
3 , 262 ,837 . 954 
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OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE 
<Strategic percentage is found by dividing e xpenditures for strategic 
forces by expenditures for total forces.) 
Army 
1. Strategic forces 
2. O.OOO'l.x Central supply & maint 
3. O.OOO'l.x Training 
4. O.OOO'l.x Administration 
Army Subtotal 
Navy 
1. Strategic forces 
2. 15.382%x Central supply ~ maint 
3. 15.382%x Training 
4 . 15.382%x Administration 
Navy Subtotal 
Air Force 
1. Strategic forces 
2. 49 . 831%x Central suppl y & maint 
3. 49 . 831%x Training 
4. 49 . 831%x Administration 
Air Force Subtotal 
Marine Corps 
1. Strategic forces 
2. O.OOO'l.x Central suppl y & maint 
3. O.OOOY.x Training 
4. O.OOO'l.x Administration 
Marine Corps Subtotal 
Defense Agencies 
0.000 
o.ooo 
0.000 
0.000 
970,803.000 
560 , 303.040 
152,000.617 
0.000 
50,109 . 634 
1 , 733,216.291 
1,680,988.000 
1,683, 755 .1 07 
508,924.003 
124,136.994 
3,997,804.104 
0.000 
0.000 
o.ooo 
0.000 
0.000 
1. Defense nuclear agency 26,750.000 
Defense Agenc y Subtotal 26,750.000 
STRATEGIC OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE 5,757,770.395 
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PROCUREMENT 
<Strategic percentage applied to s upport or maintenance procu rement 
line items is found by dividing expenditures for strategic 
procurement by e xpenditures for total procurement. ) 
Ar my 
J. Other missiles 
2. O.OOOY.x Modifi cation of missi les 
3. 0.000%x Spares and repair 
4. 0 . 000%x Support equ i pment 
Army Subtotal 
Navy 
J. Ballistic miss iles 
2. Fleet ballistic missi le ships 
3. ll.347%x Ship support equipment 
4 . ll.347'l.x Commun~ electron i c equ ip 
5. 11.347%x Ordnance support equip 
6. 11.347%x Suppl y support equ ipmen t 
7. ll.347%x Command support equip 
Navy Subtotal 
Air Force 
1. Ballistic missiles 
2 . 13.837'l.x Mod ificat i on of missiles 
3 . 13.837%x Spares and repair 
4. 13.837%x Other support 
Air Force Subtotal 
Marine Cor ps 
1 . Guided missiles~ equipment 
Marine Corps Subto tal 
STRATEGIC PROCUREMENT 
0.000 
0.000 
0 .000 
0 . 000 
945,1 00.000 
198 ,000 . 000 
60,308.511 
107,204.641 
55,945.476 
0 . 000 
6,095.495 
15 , 852 . 440 
1,388 ,506.563 
66' 100. 000 
~ ,676.906 
8,482.081 
130 , 164.659 
209,423.646 
22,800.000 
22,800.000 
1,620,730 . 209 
<Strateg ic percentage is found by divid ing expenditures f or strategic 
RDT~E by e xpenditures for total RDT~E . l 
1 . Strategic programs 
2 . 50Xx Advance techn development 
3. 21.653Xx Program mgmt ~support 
STRATEGIC RDT~E 
1,992 ,396.000 
255,877 . 000 
404,534 .987 
2 . 652 ,807.987 
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 
1. Naval reactor development 
2. Weapons 
3. Defense nuclear waste 
4. Special materials production 
5. Nuclear safeguards ~ security 
6. 93.652Y.x Program support 
CAPITAL INVESTMENT: 
7. Naval reactor dev 
8. Weapons 
9. Special materials production 
10. Defense nuclear waste 
11. Nuclear material security 
STRATEGIC DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 
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240,100.000 
1,169,850.000 
150,940. 000 
312,400.000 
35,089.000 
1,101.348 
21,000.000 
187,650 .000 
85, 085.000 
125,415.000 
3,000.000 
2,331,630.348 
1. Space and nuclear research tech 0.000 
STRATEGIC NASA 0 . 000 
PERSONNEL 3,262,837.954 
0 ~ M 5,757,770 . 395 
PROCUREMENT 1,620,730.209 
ROT~E 2,652,807.987 
ENERGY 2,331,630.348 
NASA 0.000 
1979 STRATEGIC 15,625,776.893 
96 
PERSONNEL 
<Strategic percentage is found by dividing e xpenditures for strategic 
personnel forces by total expenditures for personnel forces.) 
Army 
1. Strategic forces 
2 . 0.000%x Research & development 
3. 0.000%x Central supply & maint 
4 . 0.000%x Training 
5. 0.000%x Administration 
Army Subtotal 
Navy 
1. Strategic forces 
2. 6.638%x Research & development 
3. 6.638%x Central supply & maint 
4. 6.638%x Training 
5. 6.638%x Administration 
Navy Subtotal 
Air· Force 
1. Strategic forces 
2. 43.880%x Research & development 
3. 43.880%x Central suppl y & maint 
4. 43.880%x Training 
5 . 43.880%x Administration 
Air Force Subtotal 
Marine Corps 
1. Strateg ic forces 
2. 0 .000%x Research & development 
3. 0.000%x Central suppl y & ma i nt 
4. 0.000%x Training 
5 . 0.000%x Administration 
Marine Corps Subtotal 
STRATEGIC PERSONNEL 
0.000 
0.000 
0 .000 
0.000 
o.ooo 
261 ,289 .000 
5 ,763.045 
10' 721. 100 
164,286.185 
0 . 000 
8 ' 172. 108 
450,231.438 
1 ' 656 ' 1 79 • 000 
124,969 .362 
70,297.076 
1,035, 146 . 752 
85, 725.723 
2,972 , 31 7.913 
0 . 000 
0 . 000 
0 . 000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
3,422,549.351 
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OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE 
<Str ategic percentage is found by dividing expenditures for strategic 
for~~s by expenditures for total forces.> 
Army 
1. Strategic forces 
2. O. OOOY.x Central suppl y & maint 
3. O.OOOY.x Training 
4. O.OOOY.x Administration 
Army Subtotal 
Navy 
1. Strategic forces 
2. 17.375Y.x Central supply & maint 
3. 17.375Y.x Training 
4. 17.375Y.x Administration 
Navy Subtotal 
Air Force 
1. Strategic forces 
2. 48.823Y.x Central s~pply & maint 
3. 48.823Y.x Training 
4. 48.8231.x Administration 
Air Force Subtotal 
Marine Corps 
1. Strategic forces 
2. O.OOOY.x Central supply & maint 
3. O.OOOY.x Training 
4. O.OOOY.x Administration 
Marine Corps Subtotal 
Defense Agencies 
0.000 
0 .000 
0.000 
o.ooo 
0.000 
1,274,239.000 
727,509.841 
197,734.276 
61,975.930 
2,261,459. 047 
1 , 891 '043 . 000 
1 , 856 ' 181 • 131 
573,633.633 
152,508.405 
4 , 473 ,366 .1 69 
0.000 
0 . 000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
1. Defense nuclear agency 28,727 .000 
Defense Agenc y Subtotal 28,727.000 
STRATEGIC OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE 6,763,552.216 
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PROCUREMENT 
<Str ategic percentage applied to support or maintenance procurement 
line items is found by dividing 0 xpenditures for strategic 
procurement by e xpenditures for total procurement.) 
Army 
1. Other missiles 
2. O.OOOY.x Modification of missiles 
0. 000 
0 . 000 
0 .000 
0.000 
3. O.OOOY.x Spares and repair 
4. O.OOOY.x Support equipment 
Army Subtotal 
Navy 
1. Ball i stic missiles 
2. Fleet ballistic missile ships 
3. 14.186Y.x Ship support equipment 
0.000 
4. 14.186Y.x Commun & elec tronic equip 
804,900. 000 
1,049,650.000 
86,925.141 
145,286 .345 
61 , 854.223 
6,351. 923 
16,076.426 
5. 14.186'l.x Ordnance support equip 
6. 14.186%x Supply support equipment 
7 . 14.186Y.x Command support equip 
Navy Subtotal 
Air Force 
1. Ballistic missiles 
2' 1 71 , 044 . 068 
2. 15. 053%x Modification of miss i les 
108,500.000 
10,958.584 
14,285. 297 
194 , 858 . 827 
328,602 .708 
3. 15.053%x Spares and repair 
4. 15.053Y.x Other support 
Air Force Subtotal 
Marine Corps 
1 . Guided missiles & equ i pment 
Marine Corps Subtotal 
STRATEGIC PROCUREMENT 
20,500.000 
20,500.000 
2,520 , 146 . 776 
<S trategic percentage is found by dividing expenditures for s trategic 
RDT&E by e xpend i tures for total RDT&E. > 
1. Strategic programs 
2. 50'l.x Advance techn development 
3. 21.930%x Program mgmt & support 
STRATEGIC RDT &E 
2,199,734.000 
319,216.500 
455,287. 554 
2,974,238 . 054 
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 
1. Naval reactor development 
2. Weapons 
3. Defense nuclear waste 
4. Special ~aterials production 
5. Nuclear safeguards & security 
6. Verification & control techn 
CAPITAL INVESTMENT: 
7 . Naval reac tor dev 
8. Weapons 
9. Special materials production 
10. Defense nuclear waste 
11. Nuclear material security 
12. Verification & control tech 
STRATEGIC DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 
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249,567.000 
1 ' 351 ' 800 . 000 
195,548.000 
339,353.000 
39,612.000 
35,600. 000 
22,000. 000 
278,475.000 
138,300.000 
125,057.000 
3,400.000 
1,060.000 
2,779,772.000 
1. Space and nuclear research tech 0 . 000 
STRATEGIC NASA 0 . 000 
PERSONNEL 3,422,549.351 
0 & M 6 1 763,552 . 216 
PROCUREMENT 2,520, 146.776 
RDT&E 2,974,238.054 
ENERGY 2,779,772.000 
NASA 0.000 
1980 STRATEGIC 18,460 ,258.397 
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PERSONNEL 
<Strategic percentage is found by di viding expend itures for strategic 
personnel forces by total expenditures for personnel forces.> 
Army 
1. Strategic forces 
2 . 0 . 000%x Research & development 
3 . 0 . 000%x Central suppl y & maint 
4 . 0 .000%x Training 
5. O.OOO'l.x Administration 
Army Subtotal 
Navy 
1. Strategic forces 
2. 6 . 316%x Research & devel opment 
3. 6 . 316Y.x Central suppl y & maint 
4. 6.316Y.x Training 
5 . 6.316Y.x Administration 
Navy Subtotal 
Air Force 
1 . Strategic forces 
2. 43.946'l.x Research & development 
3. 43.946Y.x Central supp ly & maint 
4 . 43 . 946Y.x Tra ining 
5. 43 .9461.x Administration 
Air Force Subtotal 
Marine Corps 
1 . Strategic forces 
2. O. OOO'l.x Research & development 
3 . 0 . 000%x Central supply & maint 
4 . O. OOO'l. x Training 
5 . O. OOO'l.x Administ rat ion 
Marine Corps Subtotal 
STRATEGIC PERSONNEL 
0 . 000 
0 . 000 
0 . 000 
0.000 
0.000 
293,544 . 000 
6,380.234 
11,928.713 
186,682. 075 
9 ,035.164 
0.000 
507' 570. 186 
1,933,907.000 
147,427.404 
86 , 721 .7 18 
1,231,450.857 
99,730.173 
3,499,237.152 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0 . 000 
0 . 000 
4, 006,807.338 
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OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE 
<Str ategic percentage is found by dividing e xpenditures for strategic 
forc es by expenditures for total forces. > 
Army 
1 . Strategic forces 
2. O. OOOXx Central suppl y & maint 
3. O. OOOXx Training 
4. O. OOOXx Administration 
Army Subtotal 
Navy 
1 . Strategic forces 
2. 15.626Xx Central suppl y & maint 
3. 15.626Xx Training 
4. 15.626Xx Administration 
Navy Subtotal 
Air Force 
1 . Strategic forces 
2. 46 .1 24Xx Cen tral supply & maint 
3. 46.124Xx Training 
4. 46.124Xx Administration 
Air Force Subtotal 
Marine Corps 
1. Strategic forces 
2 . O.OOOXx Central suppl y & maint 
3. O.OOOXx Training 
4. O.OOO'l.x Administration 
Marine Corps Subtotal 
Defense Aaencies 
0 . 000 
o.ooo 
0.000 
0.000 
0 . 000 
1,505,790.000 
799,568.357 
222,682.376 
63,305.770 
2,591,346 . 503 
2,530,979.000 
2,102,598 . 517 
674,828.713 
161,594.512 
5,470,000 . 742 
0 .000 
0 . 000 
0 . 000 
0.000 
0 . 000 
1. De fense nuclear agenc y 28,884.000 
Defense Agency Subtotal 28,884. 000 
STRATEGIC OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE 8,090,231.245 
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PROCUREMENT 
<Strategic percentage applied to support or maintenance procurement 
line items is found by dividing expenditures for strategic 
procurement by expenditures for total procurement.> 
Army 
1. Other missiles 
2 . O.OOO'l.x Modification of missiles 
0 . 000 
0 . 000 
0 .000 
0 . 000 
3. 0.0001.x Spares and repair 
4. O.OOO'l.x Support equipment 
Army Subtotal 
Navy 
1. Ballistic missiles 
2. Fleet ballistic missile ships 
3. 12. 363%x Ship support equipment 
884,203.000 
1,135, 000 . 000 
0.000 
4. 12.363%x Commun & electronic equip 
85' 100 . 958 
129,990.145 
75,456.211 5. 12.363%x Ordnance support equip 
6 . 12.363%x Supply support equipment 8,604.524 
22,077.598 
2,340,432.436 
7. 12.3631.x Command support equip 
Navy Subtot a l 
Ai r Force 
1. Ballistic miss iles 
2. 13.409%x Modification of missiles 
141,990. 000 
14,019 . 378 
19,589. 342 
245,570.281 
421,241.001 
3 . 13.409Y.x Spares and repair 
4. 13.409Y.x Other support 
Air Force Suptotal 
Marine Corps 
l . Guided missiles & equipment 
Marine Corps Subtotal 
STRATEGIC PROCUREMENT 
91,556.000 
91,556.000 
2,853,229.437 
<Strategic percentage is found by dividing expenditures for stra tegic 
RDT&E by expenditures for total RDT&E . l 
1. Strategic programs 
2. 50%x Advance techn development 
3 . 27 . 290Y.x Program mgmt & support 
4 . 8-18 Bomber research 
STRATEGIC RDT&E 
3,470,208.000 
301,490 .000 
609,492.131 
220,000.000 
4 • 60 1 ' 1 90 . 131 
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 
1 . Naval reactor development 
2 . Weapons 
3. Defense nuclear waste 
4 . Special materials production 
5 . Nuclear safeguards & security 
CAPITAL INVESTMENT : 
6. Naval reactor dev 
7 . Weapons 
8. Special materials production 
9 . Defense nuclear waste 
STRATEGIC DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 
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259,600 . 000 
1,873,318 . 000 
234,142. 000 
451 ' 1 0 1 . 000 
40,150.000 
52 , 700.000 
341,645,000 
211,996 . 000 
77,886.000 
3,545,941.000 
1. Space and nuclear research tech 0 . 000 
STRATEGIC NASA 0 .000 
PERSONNEL 4,006,807.338 
0 & M 8 , 090,231 . 245 
PROCUREMENT 3,073 ,229.437 
RDT&E 4,381,190 .131 
ENERGY 3,545, 941. 000 
NASA 0 . 000 
1981 STRATEGIC 23 ,097,399.151 
l U'+ 
<S trategic personne l expenditure is a forecast fi gure due to cnange 
in annual budget line items . For details of forecast procedure see 
Appendix 8. > 
STRATEGIC PERSONNEL 4 , 316,982 .501 
OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE 
<S trategic percentage is found by dividing e xpenditures for strategic 
forces by expenditures for tota l forces . I 
Ar my 
1. Strategic f orces 
2. 0.000%x Central suppl y & maint 
3 . 0 . 000/.x Training 
4. 0 . 000%x Administration 
Army Subtotal 
Navy 
I. Strategic forces 
2 . 12.785%x Central suppl y & maint 
3. 12.785/.x Tr aining 
4 . 12.785'l.x Administration 
Navy Subtotal 
Air Force 
1. Strateg ic forces 
2 . 46.873'l.x Central suppl y & ma i nt 
3 . 46.873Xx Training 
4 . 46 . 873X x Administration 
Air Force Subtotal 
Marine Corps 
1. Strategic forces 
2 . O. OOO'l.x Central suppl y & mai nt 
3. 0 . 000/.x Training 
4 . O. OOO'l.x Administration 
Marine Corps Subtotal 
Defense Agencies 
1. Defense nuclear agenc y 
0 . 000 
0 . 000 
0.000 
0 . 000 
0 . 000 
1,435,282. 000 
675,095.688 
212,205.302 
55,007.718 
2,377,590. 708 
3,153,726.000 
2,282,743.224 
822,642.243 
159,955 . 050 
6,419 , 066 .51 7 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0 . 000 
0 . 000 
Defense Agenc y Subtotal 
33,531. 000 
33,531. 000 
STRATEGIC OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE 8,830,188 . 225 
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PROCUREMENT 
<Strategic percentage applied to support or maintenance procurement 
line items is found by dividing ~xpenditures for strategic 
procurement by expenditures for total procurement. > 
Army 
1. Other missiles 
2 . O. OOOY.x Modification of missiles 
0.000 
0 . 000 
0 . 000 
0.000 
3. O. OOOY.x Spares and repair 
4 . O. OOOY.x Support equipment 
Army Subtotal 
Navy 
1. Ballistic missiles 
2. Fleet ballistic missile ships 
3. 6.234Y.x Ship support equipment 
0 . 000 
4. 6 .234Y.x Commun & electronic equip 
955,000.000 
353,700.000 
43,143.394 
73, 196.262 
51,751.364 5. 6.234Y.x Ordnance support equip 
6. 6.234Y.x Supply support equipment 4,732.915 
13,140. 025 
1,4Q4,663.960 
7. 6.234Y.x Command support equip 
Navy Subtotal 
Air Force 
1. Ballistic missiles 110,762.000 
2 . 6.002Y.x Modification of missiles 4,840 .733 
12 , 590 . 275 
146,337 .823 
1,610,000.000 
1,884,530 . 831 
3. 6.002Y.x Spares and repair 
4. 6.002Y.x Other support 
5. B-18 Bomber planes 
Air Force Subtotal 
Marine Corps 
1. Guided missiles & equipment 
Marine Corps Subtotal 
STRATEGIC PROCUREMENT 
213,817.000 
213,817. 000 
3,593,011. 791 
<Stra tegic percentage is found by di v iding expenditures for strateg i c 
RDT&E by e xpenditures for total RDT&E.> 
1. Strategic programs 
2. 50%x Advance Techn Development 
3 . 28 . 586Y.x Program mgmt & support 
4 . 8-18 Bomber research 
STRATEGIC RDT&E 
4,586,427.000 
367,724.000 
759 '204 . 140 
470,000.000 
lOo 
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 
1. Naval reactor development 335 ,500.000 
2,779,056 . 000 
383 ' 1 51 . 000 
887,768.000 
42,776 . 000 
2 . Weapons 
3 . Defense waste management 
4 . Special materials production 
5. Nuclear security & safeguards 
STRATEGIC DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 4' 428,251 . 000 
1. Space and nuclear r esearch tech 0 .000 
STRATEGIC NASA 0 . 000 
PERSONNEL 4,316,982 . 501 
0 & M 8,830,188. 225 
PROCUREMENT 2,144,011.791 
RDT&E 5 ,760,355 .1 40 
ENERG Y 4,428,251 . 000 
NASA 0.000 
1982 STRATEGIC 25,479,788.657 
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<S trateg ic ~~rsanne l e xpenditure is a forecast figure due ta change 
in annual budget line items. For details of forecast procedure see 
Appendix 8. > 
STRATEGIC PERSONNEL 5,373,445.349 
OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE 
<Strategic percentage is found by dividing expenditures for strateg ic 
forces by e xpenditures for total forces.) 
Army 
1. Strategic forces 
2. O.OOOY.x Central suppl y & maint 
3. O.OOOY.x Training 
4. O.OOOY.x Administration 
Army Subtotal 
Navy 
1. Strategic forces 
2. 14.069Y.x Central suppl y & maint 
3. 14.069Y.x Training 
4. 14.069Y.x Administration 
Navy Subtotal 
Air Force 
1. Strategic forces 
2. 44.917Y.x Central supp ly & maint 
3. 44.917Y.x Training 
4. 44.917Y.x Administration 
Air Force Subtotal 
Marine Corps 
1. Strategic forces 
2. O.OOOY.x Central suppl y & maint 
3. O. OOOY.x Training 
4. O.OOOY.x Administration 
Marine Corps Subtotal 
Defense Agencies 
1. Defense nuclear agency 
0.000 
0 . 000 
0 . 000 
0 .000 
0 . 000 
1,720,732. 000 
792,194.016 
258,968.505 
66 ,009.356 
2,837,903.877 
3,044,998.000 
2,413 , 364.358 
861,539 . 523 
1 78 I 37 6 • 187 
6,498,278.068 
0.000 
0 . 000 
0 .000 
0 .000 
0 . 000 
Defense Agency Subtotal 
41,256.000 
41.256.000 
STRATEGIC OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE 9,377,437.945 
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PROCUREMENT 
<Strategic percentage applied to support or maintenance procurement 
line items is found by di vi ding expendi~ures for s t ra tegic 
procurement by expenditures for total procurement .> 
Army 
l. Other missiles 
2. O.OOOY.x Modi f ication of miss iles 
0 . 000 
0 . 000 
0 .000 
0 . 000 
3. O.OOOY.x Spares and repair 
4 . O. OOOY.x Support equ ipment 
Army Subtotal 
Navy 
l . Ballistic missi l es 
2 . Fleet ballistic missile ships 
3. 7.450Y.x Ship support equipment 
0.000 
696,500.000 
1,534 ,800.000 
39,492.227 
105,029.281 
51,742.783 
4. 7.450Xx Commun & electronic equip 
5. 7.4501.x Ordnance support equip 
6. 7 . 450Xx Suppl y support equipment 6,051.188 
16,943.908 
2 ,450,559.~87 
7. 7.450Xx Command support equip 
Navy Subtotal 
Air Force 
1. Ballistic missiles 
2. O.OOOY.x Modification of missiles 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0 . 000 
3. O.OOOY.x Spares and repair 
4. O.OOOY.x Other support 
5. B-lB Bomber planes 
Air Force Subtotal 
Marine Corps 
l . Guided missiles & equipment 
Marine Corps Subtotal 
STRATEGIC PROCUREMENT 
4,040,000 . 000 
4,040,000.000 
242,860.000 
242,860.000 
6,733,419.387 
<S trategic percentage is found by dividing expend itures for s trategi c 
RDT&E by expenditures for total RDT&E.l 
1. Strategic programs 
2. 50Xx Advance Techn Development 
3. 31 . 7331.x Program mgmt & support 
4. 8-18 Bomber research 
STRATEGIC RDT&E 
5,900, 741.000 
41 0,2 12 . 500 
925,618.290 
750,000.000 
7,986,571 . 790 
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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 
1 . Naval reactor development 418,877 . 000 
3,351,536.000 
473, 058. 000 
1,308 , 820 . 000 
47 ,611. 000 
2 . Weapons 
3. Defense waste management 
4. Special mater i als production 
5. Nuclear secur i t y ~safeguards 
STRATEGIC DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 5 , 599 , 902. 000 
1. Space and nuc lear research tech 0 . 000 
STRATEGIC NASA 0 . 000 
PERSONNEL 5 , 373 , 445. 349 
0 & M 9 , 377, 437 . 9 45 
PROCUREMENT 6 ,733 1 4 19.387 
RDT&E 7 ,986, 57 1 .790 
ENERGY 5, 599 ,902.000 
NASA 0 . 000 
1983 STRATEGI C 35, 070,776 .47 1 
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<Strategic personne l expenditure is a forecast figure due to change 
in annual budget line items. For details of forecast procedure see 
,Appendix B. > 
STRATEGIC PERSONNEL 5,972,843.995 
OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE 
<Strategic percentage is found by dividing e xpenditures for strateg ic 
forces by expenditures for total forces. ) 
Army 
1. Strategic forces 
2. O. OOOY.x Central supply ~ maint 
3. O.OOOY.x Training 
4 . O.OOOY.x Administration 
Army Subtotal 
Navy 
1 . Strategic forces 
2 . 15.902Y.x Central supply ~ maint 
3. 15.902Y.x Training 
4 . 15.902Y.x Administration 
Navy Subtotal 
Air Force 
1. Strategic forces 
2. 44.098Y.x Central suppl y ~ maint 
3. 44. 098Y.x Training 
4. 44 . 098%x Administration 
Air Force Subtotal 
Marine Corps 
1. Strategic forces 
2. O.OOOY.x Central suppl y ~ maint 
3. O.OOOY.x Training 
4. O.OOOXx Administration 
Marine. Corps Subtotal 
Defense Agencies 
1. Defense nuclear agency 
0.000 
0 . 000 
0.000 
0.000 
0 . 000 
1,946, 104.000 
946,-477 . 499 
316,284.419 
98,856.850 
3,307,722.768 
3,038,056.000 
2,368,911. 927 
862,051.517 
229,888.166 
6,498,907 .61 0 
0.000 
0 . 000 
0 . 000 
0.000 
0 . 000 
Defense Agency Subtotal 
45, 093 . 000 
45,093.000 
STRATEGIC OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE 9,851,723 . 378 
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PROCUREMENT 
<Strategic percentage applied to support or maintenance procurement 
line items is found by dividing e xpenditures for strategic 
procurement by e xpenditures for total procurement .) 
Army 
1. Other missiles 
2. O.OOOY.x Modification of missiles 
3. 0 . 000%x Spares and repair 
4. 0.000%x Support equipment 
Army Subtotal 
Navy 
1. Ballistic missiles 
2. Fleet ballistic missile ships 
3. 8 . 873%x Ship support equipment 
0.000 
0 . 000 
0 . 000 
0.000 
578,400.000 
1,672,700.000 
0 .000 
4. 8.873%x Commun & electron(c equip 
59' 141 . 917 
134 , 285.934 
79,963.831 5. 8.873%x Ordnance support equip 
6. 8 . 873% x Supply support equ i pment 
7. 8.873%x Command support equip 
Navy Subtotal 
Air Force 
9 , 437.766 
24 , 837.923 
2,558,767.371 
1. Ballistic missiles 2,110,188.000 
2. 49 . 581%x Modification of missiles 68,099.504 
3 . 49.581%x Spares and repair 164 , 667.921 
4. 49.581%x Other support 1,530,214.932 
5 . B-lB Bomber planes 6 1 120,000.000 
Air Force Subtotal 9,993,170.357 
Marine Corps 
1. Guided missiles & equipment 
Marine Corps Subtotal 
STRATEGIC PROCUREMENT 
170,915.000 
170 , 915.000 
12 ,722,852.728 
<Strategic percentage is found by dividing expenditures for strategic 
RDT&E b y expenditures for total RDT&E.> 
1. Strategic programs 
2. 50%x Advance Techn Development 
3. 36.193%x Program mgmt & support 
4. 8-18 Bomber research 
STRATEGIC RDT&E 
7,842,682.000 
693,097.500 
1,188 ,661.364 
740,000.000 
10,464,440.864 
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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 
1. Naval reactor development 493,398.000 
3,764,237.000 
723,411.000 
1,545,929.000 
53,118.000 
2. Weapons 
3. Defense waste management 
4. Special materials production 
5. Nuclear security & safeguards 
STRATEGIC DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 6,580,093.000 
1. Space and nuclear research tech 0.000 
STRATEGIC NASA 0 .000 
PERSONNEL 5,972 , 843 .995 
0 & M 9,851,723.378 
PROCUREMENT 12,722 , 852.728 
RDT&E 10,464,440 . 864 
ENERGY 6,580,093.000 
NASA 0.000 
1984 STRATEGIC 45,591,953.965 
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<S trategic personnel e xpendi t ure is a forecast figure due to -ha nge 
in annual budget line items. For details of forecast procedure see 
Appendix 8.> 
STRATEGIC PERSONNEL 8,651 , 140.824 
OPERATIONS ANO MAINTENANCE 
<S trategic percentage is found by dividing expend itures for strateg ic 
forces by expenditures for total forc es .> 
Army 
1. Str ategic forc es 
2. O.OOOY.x Central s uppl y & maint 
3 . O. OOOY.x Training 
4 . O. OOOY.x Administration 
Army Subtotal 
Navy 
1 . Strategic forces 
2. 15.895Y.x Central suppl y & maint 
3. 15.895Y.x Training . 
4 . 15 . 895'l.x Administration 
Navy Subtotal 
Air Force 
1 . Strategic forces 
2 . 44.203Y.x Central suppl y & maint 
3. 44 . 203'l.x Training 
4 . 44 . 203'l.x Administrati on 
Air Force Subtotal 
Marine Corps 
1. St ra teg ic forc e s 
2 . O. OOO'l.x Centr al supply & maint 
3. O.OOO'l.x Traini ng 
4 . O. OOOY.x Adm1nistration 
Marine Corps Subtotal 
Defense Agenc ies 
I. Defense nuclear agency 
0.000 
0.000 
0 . 000 
0 .000 
2,257,266.000 
1 ,003,237 . 244 
373,798.900 
0.000 
11 1 ' 611 • 6 70 
3,745,913 . 814 
3,195,898 . 000 
2,636 , 706 . 740 
907,086 . 669 
250, 1 79 . 255 
6,989,870 . 664 
0.000 
0 . 000 
0.000 
0.000 
0 .000 
Defense Agency Subtotal 
47,566.000 
47,566.000 
STRATEGIC OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE 10,783,350 . 480 
1 11.+ 
PROCUREMENT 
<Strategic percentage appl i ed to support or ma intenanc e procurement 
line items is found by dividing expenditures for s t r ategic 
procure ment by expenditures for total procurement . ) 
Ar my 
1. Other missiles 
2 . O.OOO'l.x Modification of missiles 
3. O.OOO'l.x Spares and repair 
4. 0 . 0001.x Support equ i pment 
Army Subtotal 
Navy 
1. Ballisti c missiles 
2. Fleet ballistic miss i le ships 
3. 7 .8871.x Ship s upport equipment 
0.000 
0 . 000 
0.000 
0.000 
385, 775 . 000 
1, 724,674.000 
60,519.317 
4. 7 . 8871.x Commun & electronic equip 142,978.139 
89,867.554 
10,864 . 816 
42,389.943 
5. 7.887'l.x Ordnance support equip 
6. 7.8871.x Suppl y support equipment 
0 . 000 
7. 7 . 887Y.x Command support equip 
Navy Subtotal 2,457,068.769 
Ai r Forc e 
1. Balli s tic miss iles 1,449,752 . 000 
2. 38 . 9341.x Mod i fication of missi les 75 ,278 .889 
3. 38 . 934'l.x Spares and repair 187,277 . 212 
4 . 38 . 934Y.x Other s uppor t 1,266,631 . 646 
5 . 8-18 Bomber planes 7,7 10,000 . 000 
Air Force Subtotal 10,688,939.747 
Marine Corps 
1. Guided missiles & equipment 
Marine Corps Subtotal 
STRATEGI C PROCUREMENT 
239,897 . 000 
239,897 . 000 
13,385,905 .516 
<S trateg ic percentage is found by dividing expenditures for strategic 
RDT&E by expenditures for to tal RDT&E.> 
1. Strateg ic programs 
2. 50Y.x Adva nce Techn Development 
3 . 35 . 168'l.x Program mgmt & support 
4. 8- 18 Bomber res earch 
STRATEGIC RDT&E 
8 , 358 ,953.000 
1,382,904 . 000 
1,319,226.940 
5 10,000.000 
11,57 1,123.940 
11 5 
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 
1. Naval reactor development 500 ,421 .000 
4,2::>8,394. 000 
844,528 . 000 
1 ' 811 '536. 000 
63,688. 000 
2. Weapons 
3. Defense waste management 
4. Special materials production 
5 . Nuclear security ~ safeguards 
STRATEGIC DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 7, 448,567. 000 
1. Space and nuclear research tec h 0.000 
STRATEGIC NASA 0 . 000 
PERSONNEL 8, 65 1,140.824 
0 & M 10 , 783,350 . 480 
PROCUREMENT 13 , 385,905 . 516 
RDT&E 1 1, 571, 123 . 940 
ENERGY 7,448 , 567 . 000 
NASA 0 . 000 
1985 STRATEGIC 5 1 ,840,087 . 7 60 
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APPENDI X E: 
TABLES OF COEFFICIENT ESTIMATE RESULTS 
Table 6. OLS coefficient estimates for the demand of military e xpendi-
tures using 1980 exchange rates : Strategic procurement sp il-
lins, conventional spillins and dummy variable after 1981 
<t statistics in parentheses) 
ME . t=a . +(l 1 .GDP . t+f'l 2 .CSP _ t 1+a 3 .NUC. t 1+a 4 .REAGAN . t+e . t 1 1 I l 1 1, - l 1, - 1 1 l 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- -
Nat ion 
Variable 
GDP 
CSP 
NUC 
REAGAN 
Constant 
A-square 
Rho 
United 
Sta tes 
0.016 
<O. 70) 
-0.271 
C-0.35) 
35 . 411 ** 
<4.14•) 
15.505 
( 1.67) 
23.057 
<0 .67) 
1. 251 
0 . 95 
France 
0 . 040** 
C19 . 38l 
0 . 042** 
C3.30l 
-0.219** 
(-3 . 77) 
-0 . 666 
( -1. 12 ) 
-8 .146** 
(-3.46 ) 
1 . 544 
0 . 99 
United 
Kingdom 
0 . 029** 
(3 . 75) 
0.049* 
( 1. 85) 
0.021 
<0 .1 9) 
0 . 774 
<0.61) 
-0.3'/0 
(-0.07) 
2 . 223 
0 . 93 
Canada 
0 . 0 11** 
<5.78) 
0 . 003 
C0.59l 
0.063** 
(2 . 74) 
0 . 568** 
( 2 . 3 1) 
0 . 669 
C0 . 72) 
1. 894 
0 . 97 
------------,-----------------------------------------------------------
aAutocorrelation corrected using AR< t >. 
bDurbin- Watson test significant points at . 05 l evel : 
du = 1 . 977. 
d = 0 . 685 
L 
**Statist ic ally significant two tail t -test at . 05 level: t=2 . 228 ; 
for Netherlands equation t=2 . 262 . 
•Stati st icall y significant two tail t-test at .1 0 level: t=l.81 2 : 
for Netherlands equation t =l.833 . 
Be lgium 
0 . 049iH 
(10.02) 
0 . 004 
<0 . 98) 
-0.027 
(-1.35) 
-0.253 
(- 1.26 ) 
-2.655** 
(-3 .40) 
Nether-
lands a 
0.024** 
(14.43) 
0.003 
<O. 92) 
-0.014 
(-1.16) 
-0.0005 
(-0.003) 
0.766 
(1.61) 
Denmark 
0.020·H 
(3.73) 
0.004 
( 1 • 64 ) 
-0 . 027** 
(-2.88) 
-0.074 
(-0.72) 
-0.405 
(-1 . 00) 
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Norway 
0.025** 
(6. 91) 
-0.002 
<-0.80l 
0.012 
( 1.16) 
0.096 
(0.90) 
0 . 650 
( 1. 52) 
West 
Germany 
0 . 0 24H· 
(6.07) 
-0.007 
(-0 .30) 
- 0.096 
( -0.93 ) 
0.739 
<O. 71) 
9.804*• 
<2 . 55 ) 
Ital y 
0 . 0 13* 
<6.49) 
-0.024* 
( -2.24 ) 
0. 11 O* 
<2 .24l 
1 . 245~ 
<2 .47 ) 
8.599* 
(4 .52 ) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------
1 . 744 2 . 704 1. 914 2.675 1. 081 2.374 
0.96 0.96 0 .89 0.94 0 .91 0 .90 
-0.746** 
(-3.39) 
--------------------------~------------------------------------------
Table 7 . OLS coefficient estimates for the demand of military expe ndi-
tures using 1980 exchange rates: Strategic procurement spil-
lins, conventional spillins and dummy variable times spill1ns 
after 1981 <t statistics in parentheses ) 
ME . t=a .+fl 1 .GDP . t+fl 2 .CSP . t 1+a 3 .D-CSP 1 l 1 1 1 1 . - 1 1 • t-1 
Nation 
Variable 
GDP 
CSP 
D·CSP 
NUC 
D·NUC 
Constant 
ow b 
R-square 
Rho 
+(l 4iNUC i, t-l+(l 4iD-NUC i, t-te it 
United 
States 
-0.014 
(-0.9 1 ) 
0 .651 
( 1. 27 ) 
10. 513** 
(3.48) 
37.830•* 
(7. 63> 
-303.415** 
(-3 .44) 
4. 119 
<0 .23> 
1. 923 
0 . 989 
France 
0 .041** 
( 18 . 76) 
0 . 052** 
(4 . 67) 
- 0 . 003 
( -1.13> 
-0 . 063 
(-0 .46 ) 
-0. 147 
(-0. 91) 
-11, 272H 
(-4 . 04 ) 
1. 630 
0 .99 
United 
Ki ngdom 
0 . 021** 
<2.83) 
0 . 028 
( 1. 59) 
-0 . 009 
C-0 .45> 
- 0 . 436-* 
( -1. 91) 
0 .520* 
( 1. 84) 
11.267• 
( 1 . 94) 
2 . 489 
0 . 96 
Canada 
0 .01 0-H 
<3 .1 7) 
0 . 0 14'H 
<2.49 ) 
- 0 . 0006 
(-0 .26 ) 
0 . 035 
<0.43> 
0 . 023 
<0. 23 ) 
- 1. 130 
<-0.73> 
0 . 95 
------------ -------------------------------------------------------- --' 
aAutocorrelation corrected using AR <l> . 
b 
Durbin-Watson test signi fic ant points at . 05 level : d l = 0 . 562 
du = 2 . 220 . 
**Statisticall y significant two ta i l t-test a t .05 level: t =2 . 262 : 
fo r Netherlands equati on t=2.306. 
• Stati s t ica lly signifi cant two tail t-test at .1 0 l evel : t=l . 833 ; 
for Netherlands eouat1on t=l.86~. 
120 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Nether- Wes t 
Belgium lands 
a Denmar k Norwa y Ger ma ny Ita l y 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
0 . 048** 0 . 024** 0 . 0 20** 0 . 026** 0 . 02 1 ** 0 . 0 16** 
<7.98 ) <12 . 08 ) ( 3.32 ) (5.37 ) ( 4.30) ( 6. 10> 
0.004 0. 003 0 . 005** - 0 . 0006 0 . 004 - 0 . 01 1 
( 1. 21 ) ( 1.50) (2 . 65 ) ( - 0. 26 ) <O . 19 ) ( -1 . 16) 
- 0 . 001 - 0 . 0002 - 0 . 0007 0 . 0004 -0 . 005 0 . 010** 
( - 0 . 81 ) (-0. 20) ( -1. 09 ) co . 49) ( - 0 .56) ( 2 . l. 6l 
- 0 . 0 17 - 0. 125 - 0 . 025 0 . 0 20 - 0. 290 0 . 324** 
( - 0 .30) ( - 0 .32 ) ( -1. 07) <0 .68 ) ( -1 .03 ) (2 .30) 
0 . 003 0 .002 0.006 - 0.015 0 . 230 - 0 .324* 
(0 . 04 ) <O . 0 4 ) (0 .20) (-0 . 4 1 ) (Q . 68 ) ( -1. 97) 
-2.740** 0 . 645 - 0 .60 1 0 .260 10 . 640* 3 . 23 1• 
( -2.53 ) (Q .88 ) (- 1.14) <0 . 49) ( 1. 87 ) ( l. 31 ) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
2 . 080 2 .677 2 .0 16 2.498 1. 144 2.615 
0 .96 0. 96 0 .92 0 . 94 0 . 9 1 0 . 9 1 
- 0 . 754H 
<-3.21 ) 
Table 8 . OLS coefficient estima t es f or the dema nd of mil i t ary e ~ pend 1-
tures using 1980 e xchange rates: U. S. strategi c spi ll i ns 
and dummy after 1981 Ct statistics in parentheses > 
ME. t=a. +al . GDP t+a2 . CSP t l+a3 . USSTRAT t 1 
l l l I l l, - l l, -
Nat i on 
Variable 
GDP 
CSP 
USSTRAT 
+a4iREAGANit+eit 
United 
Sta tes 
0 .023 
<0 .64 ) 
- 0 . 237 
( - 0 . 19 ) 
REAGAN 43 . 8 16** 
(4.37 ) 
Constant 102 . 391** 
<2 . 24 ) 
1.244 
R-square 0 . 87 
Rho 
I 
France 
0 . 039** 
( 18 . 12) 
0 . 05 1 ** 
<3 . 60 ) 
-0 . 107•• 
<-3 . 40) 
-0 . 383 
<-0 . 66 ) 
-7 . 389H 
<- 3 .20) 
1 . 630 
0 . 99 
United 
Ki ngdom 
0 . 030H' 
( 3. 75 ) 
0 . 048 
( 1. 75) 
0 . 04 1 
C0 .69 l 
0 .844 
(0 . 69) 
-0 . 17 1 
( - 0 . 03 ) 
2 . 247 
0 . 93 
Ca nada 
0 . 0 120 
<5 . 92l 
0 . 002 
<0 . 39 ) 
0 . 037H 
<3. 18 ) 
0 . 504• 
<2 . 17) 
0 . 502 
(0 . 57 ) 
1 . 780 
0 . 97 
------------1-------·------------------- --------------- ------------ ------
aAutocorrelation correc ted us ing AR <! ) . 
bDurb i n-Wat s on tes t si gni fi ca nt point s a t . 05 level : dl = 0 . 685 
<\J = 1. 977 ; fo r U. S. equati on ~ = 0 . 8 14 du = 1 . 750 . 
0Statist1cal l y s i gnifican t two ta11 t- test at . 05 level : t=2 . 228 ; 
f or U. S. equat ion t:2.20 1; f or Netherlands equati on t =2 . 262. 
•Statistically signifi cant two tail t - test at .1 0 l eve l : t =l . 812 ; 
for U. S . equati on t:J . 796 : f or Netherlands equation t= l. 833 . 
Belgium 
0 . 048** 
( 9.97) 
0 . 005 
( 1. 26) 
-0.016 
( -1. 62) 
-0.225 
( -1. 21) 
-2.561** 
<-3.SO l 
Nether-
1 ands a 
0 .024** 
( 14 .68) 
0.002 
<0. 88 > 
-0 . 006 
(-1.0 1 ) 
0 . 032 
(Q.24) 
0 .860* 
( 1 .86 ) 
Denmark 
0 . 019** 
(3 .53 ) 
0 . 004* 
( 1. 83) 
-0 . 014** 
(-2.84) 
-0.036 
(-0 . 37) 
-0.281 
<-0.73 ) 
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Norwa y 
0 . 025** 
(6 . 76) 
-0.002 
( - 0 .83 ) 
0.005 
C 1 . OS> 
0.080 
<O. 77l 
0 . 611 
( 1. 46) 
West 
Germany 
0 . 024** 
<5.84 ) 
-0.008 
( - 0 . 33) 
-0.049 
( - 0 .90) 
0 .882 
C0.87> 
10.249** 
(2 . 70) 
I tal y 
0.013** 
(6.57) 
-0 . 025** 
( -2.34) 
0 . 0 51• 
<2 . 04) 
1. 080** 
<2.24) 
8.155** 
(4 .47 ) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
1 . 772 2.732 1.-906 2.692 1 . 068 2.408 
0 .94 0 . 96 0 .89 0 .94 0.90 0 . 91 
-0.745** 
(-3 . 37) 
Table 9 . OLS coefficient estimates for the demand of military e xpendi-
tures using 1980 e xchange rates: U.S . st r ategic spill ins 
and dummy variable times spillins after 1981 <t statistics 
in parentheses > 
ME . t=a. +r'!1 . GDP. t+r'!2 . CSP. t 1 +a3 . D·CSP t. l i 1 1 1 1 i, - l 1 , -
Nation 
Variable 
+(!4i USSTRATi ' t-1 ~ a5 i D·USSTRATi, t-1 +ei t 
Uni ted 
States France 
United 
Kingd om Canada 
------------------------------------------------------------
GDP 
CSP 
D·CSP 
USSTRAT 
D·USSTRAT 
Cons tant 
R-square 
Rho 
- 0 . 022 
( -0.57 > 
1 . 478 
( 1 .20 > 
0 .329** 
<3 . 44 ) 
48 . 783 
( 1. 10 ) 
l . 094 
0 . 82 
0 . 040H 
( 17 .24 ) 
0.056** 
(4 . 97> 
0 . 006 
<0. 67) 
-0 . 002 
(-0 . 02) 
-0 . 107 
( - 1 . 19) 
- 11. 455** 
<-4. 0 1) 
1.606 
0 .99 
0 . 020** 
(2 .60) 
. 0.037* 
<2. 16 ) 
- 0 . 0 16 
( - 1 . 10) 
-0 . 222 
( 1. 67) 
0.283 
< l . 75> 
12. 0 16* 
( 1 . 89) 
2.560 
0. 96 
aAutocorrelation corrected us i ng AR<l) . 
bDu r bin- Watson test significan t points at . 05 leve l : 
du = 1.977, for U.S . equation dl = 0 . 946 d = 1. 543 . u 
O. Ol \ 1Hf· 
(3 . 65) 
0.013** 
(2.35 > 
0 . 002 
<0 . 35 ) 
0 . 061 
( 1. 35> 
-0 . 024 
(-0 . 45) 
- 2 . 140 
(-1. 31) 
2 . 160 
0 . 95 
d = 0 . "185 
L 
•*Stat i stical ly signifi cant two tail t-test at .05 level : t=2 . 228 : 
for U. S . equa t ion t=2 . 179 : for Netherlands equation t=2 . 306 . 
*St atisticall y significant two tai l t-test at . 10 level : t=l .812 : 
for U. S. equation t=l.782; for Netherlands equation t=l . 860 . 
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---------------------------------------------------------------------
Nether- West 
Belgium lands a Denmark Norwav Germanv Italy 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
0 . 046** 0.024•* 0.020** 0.027** 0 . 0 23** 0 . 0 16** 
<7 .58 ) ( 12 . 28) ( 3 . 02) ( 5.31 ) ( 3 . 95) (6 .52 l 
0 . 005 0 . 003 0 . 005H· -0. 00 1 0 . 006 -0 . 0 15 
( 1 . 45) ( 1 . 64 ) <2 . 82 ) ( - 0 . 53 ) (0 . 27 > ( -1 . 72l 
- 0 . 002 0.0003 -0.0005 0 . 00 1 -0 . 002 0 . 018** 
( -0.83) <O. 16) (-0.33) <O . 79) (-0 . 85) <2 .42 ) 
-0 . 022 0 . 0001 -0.009 0 . 017 -0 . 0 72 0 . 180** 
(-0.75) <0.004 ) ( - 0 . 68) ( 1 . 02) ( - 0 . 41) (2 . 50 ) 
-0.015 -0 . 006 -0. 00 1 -0 . 016 0.028 -0 . 181 * 
(0 .45 ) (-0.23) ( - 0 . 06) ( - 0.77) <0 .13 ) <- 2 . 14 ) 
-2.250* 0 .508 -0. 611 0 .074 8.723 2.365 
( -1. 99 ) <0 . 61) (- 1 . 02 ) <O . 13 l ( 1 . 26 ) (() . 94 ) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
1 . 991 2.713 1 .922 2.687 0 . 902 2.687 
0 . 97 0 . 96 0 .91 0 . 95 0 .90 0 .92 
-0.757** 
( -3.22 ) 
Table 10. DLS coefficient estimates for the demand of militar y e xoendi-
tures us1ng 1980 exchange rates: U.S. strategic procurement 
as spillin Ct statistics in parentheses > 
ME . t=cx . +t'l 1 .GDP . t+(l 2 .CSP . t 1+11 3 .USPRO . t 1+e 1 1 1 l l 1, - l l, - 1 t 
Nat ion 
Variable 
Uni ted 
States 
GDP 0 . 006 
CSP 
USP RO 
C0 .25 ) 
3 .69•* 
C3.28l 
Constant -252 .145* 
<-2 . 05) 
1.940 
France 
0 . 040** 
( 18.85 ) 
0 . 029H 
( 4. 13> 
-0 .207** 
C-3 .55l 
-5 .476** 
(-5 . 6 1) 
1 .494 
United 
Kingdom 
0 . 029** 
<3 .87) 
0 . 062H 
( 5. 11 ) 
0 . 0 19 
<0.18) 
- 2 . 971 
( -1. 08) 
2.249 
Canada 
O. Ol OH 
(4.52 > 
0 . 0 15** 
{ 5 . 19 ) 
0.050 • 
( 1.94 ) 
-1.33HH 
C-3. 02> 
2. 082 
R-square I 0.94 0.99 0 .93 0 . 95 
I 
Rho I 0 . 743** I (7.30) 
------------ ,-----------------------------------------------------------
aAutocorrelation corrected using AR <l l . 
bDurbin-Watson test si gnificant points at . 05 level: d l = 0 . 8t4 
'\J = 1. 750 . 
**Statistically signific an t t wo tail t-test at . 05 leve l: t=2.20 1 ; 
for Netherlands equation t =2 . 228. 
• Statisticall y si gnific ant two t a il t - test at . 10 l e vel : t=l. 796 : 
for Nether l ands equat ion t=l .8 12 . 
Belgium 
0 . 050** 
( 10.22 > 
- 0 . 0007 
(-0 .35 > 
-0 . 023 
(-1.20 ) 
-1.774** 
(-4.67 ) 
Nether-
lands a 
0 . 024** 
<17 . 97) 
0 . 002** 
<2 . 94 ) 
-0.014 
( -1 . 35) 
0.784** 
(4.68) 
Denmark 
0 . 021** 
( 4.07> 
0.002 
( 1 . 54) 
-0.026** 
<-2.99 ) 
-0 .1 36 
( - 0 . 71 ) 
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Norwav 
0.024** 
(6 .99 ) 
0 .00007 
<0 . 05 ) 
0 .0 10 
( 1 . 02) 
0. 286 
( 1 . 68) 
West 
Germany 
0 . 024** 
(6 .2 1) 
0 . 004 
<O . 34 ) 
-0.097 
(- 1. 00) 
7. 494** 
<3. 89) 
Ital y 
0 . 0 12** 
<5 . 20 l 
0 . 0002 
<0 . 03 l 
0 . 087 
( 1. 54 ) 
4 .220H' 
( 4.63 ) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
1.80 1 2. 7 13 l. 772 2 . 429 0 .9 16 l . 941 
0.95 0 .96 0. 89 0.94 0 .90 0 .85 
-0 . 750** 
( -3.63 ) 
Table 11. OLS coeff1cient estimates for the demand of militar y e xoendi-
tures using 1980 e xchange rates : U. S. strategic procurement 
spillins and dummy variable after 1981 Ct statistics in paren-
theses ) 
ME . t=cx -+a 1 .GDP - t+a 2 .CSP - t 1+a 3 .USPRO - +a _REAGAN . +e -
l l l l l l, - l l,t-1 4i it it 
Nation 
Variable 
United 
States 
GDP 0.023 
CSP 
USPRO 
(0.64) 
-0 . 237 
( -0. 19 ) 
REAGAN 43.816** 
(4.37 ) 
Constant 102 . 391** 
(2.24) 
1.244 
A-square 0.87 
Rho I 
France 
0.040** 
(19.20) 
0 . 04 1H 
<3.26) 
-0.219H 
<-3.76 ) 
- 0 . 703 
( -1. 17 ) 
-7. 992** 
<-3.40) 
1 . 549 
0 . 99 
United 
Ki ngdom 
0 . 029H· 
C3.79l 
0 . 048* 
( 1. 89) 
0. 027 
co . 25 ) 
0 . 802 
C0 . 63l 
-0 . 303 
(-0 . 06 ) 
2 . 231 
0 . 93 
Canada 
0.0110 
<5 . 64) 
0 . 005 
<0 . 92 > 
0 . Q59H 
( 2. 61) 
0 .553* 
( 2 . 21) 
0 .564 
C0 .60> 
1.856 
0 .97 
------------!-----------------------------------------------------------
aAutocorrelation corrected using AR <l l . 
bDurbin-Watson test significant ooints at . 05 level: dl = 0 .685 
du= 1.977, for U. S. equation dl = 0 .814 du= 1. 750 . 
**Statisticall y significant two ta il t-test at . 05 l e vel: t =2 . 228 : 
for U. S . equation t=2.201; for Netherlands equation t=2.262. 
•Statistically signif ic ant two tail t-test at .1 0 level: t=l.812 : 
for U. S . equation t=l.796: for Netherlands equation t=l . 833. 
# 
Be lgium 
0 . 049** 
( 10 . 34) 
0 . 004 
C0 . 9 2 ) 
-0.027 
( -1 .43) 
-0 . 25 5 
(- 1 . 28) 
- 2 . 639** 
(-3 . 43) 
Nether-
1 andsa 
0.024** 
(15 . 9 8 ) 
0.002 
C0 . 92> 
-0.014 
( -1. 24) 
-0 . 0001 
(-0 . 001) 
0.784 
( 1. 67 ) 
Denmark 
0 . 021** 
(3.94) 
0.003 
( 1. 47) 
-0.027** 
(-3.00> 
-0 . 741 
(-0 . 74) 
- 0 . 390 
(-0.99) 
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Norway 
0.025•• 
(6.95) 
-0.002 
(-0.7 1 ) 
0.0 11 
(1.15) 
0 . 094 
<0 . 89) 
0.628 
( 1. 49 ) 
West 
Ge rmany 
0.024** 
(6 . 13 l 
- 0 .101 
( -0 . 47) 
-0. 082 
( - 0 .81 ) 
0 .789 
<O . 75) 
9.986•• 
<2.59 ) 
Jtalv 
0 . 013** 
(6 .48 ) 
- 0 . 021• 
<-2.09 ) 
0 . 105 
<2 .22 ) 
1 .228** 
( 2 . 44) 
8 . 427·** 
(4.47 ) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
1. 784 2.713 1 . 933 2.660 1 . 081 2 . 375 
0 . 96 0.96 0 .89 0.95 0 . 90 0 . 90 
-0 . 750H 
(-3 . 44) 
Table 12. OLS coefficient estimates for the demand of military e xpendi-
tures using 1980 exchange rates: U. S . strategic procurement 
spillins and dummy var i able times spillins aft er 1981 Ct 
statistics in parentheses> 
ME . t=a. +al . GDP. t +a2. CSP. t 1 +a3. D·CSP. t 1 
l 1 l l 1 l, - l 1 , -
~a4 . USPRO. t 1 +a5 . D. USP RO . +e. 
1 1, - l l,t-1 it 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nati on 
Variable 
Uni l ed 
States Fr ance 
United 
Kingdom Canada 
------------,-----------------------------------------------------------
GDP 
CSP 
D·CSP 
USP RO 
D·USPRO 
Cons tant 
! 
-0.022 
(-0 . 57) 
1 . 478 
( 1. 20> 
0 .329** 
(3.44) 
48 . 783 
( 1. 10) 
0.04 1** 
( 18. 3 1) 
0 . 051** 
(4 .53) 
-0.003 
(-1. 38 ) 
-0.059 
( - 0 .42 > 
-o. 1 s ·1 
( - 0 .93) 
-1 1. 22 1 ** 
(-3.86) 
0 . 022** 
<3 . 07) 
0 . 019 
( 1.0ll 
0 . 004 
<0.87) 
-0 . 427* 
(-1 . 82> 
0 . 508 
( 1 . 77). 
11.1 25• 
( 1 . 87) 
0 . 009·H 
(3 .24) 
0 . 0 14** 
<2 .35> 
-0.0004 
(-0 . 28 ) 
0 . 027 
(0 . 33) 
0 . 03 l 
co . 3 1 ) 
-1 . 049 
(-0 . 62 ) 
------------ ------------------------------------------------------------
DWb 1. 094 1.648 2 . 455 I .936 
A-square 0 . 82 0.99 0 . 96 0 . 95 
Rho 
------------!-----------------------------------------------------------
aHutoc orre lation corrected using AR<l ) . 
bDurbin-Watson test significant points at . 05 level : 
du = 1. 977, for U. S . equation dl = 0 .946 du = 1.543 . 
d = 0 . 685 
L 
••Sta tistically significant two tail t-test at . 05 level : t=2 . 262 : 
for U. S . equation t=2 . 20 1 ; for Netherlands equation t=2.306 . 
• Statisti call y significant two tail t-test at . 10 level: t= I .833 : 
for U. S . equation t=l. 796 ; for Netherlands equation t=l . 860 . 
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Ne t her- West 
Belgium lands a Denmar k Norwa y Germa ny ltal v 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
0.048H· 0 . 024·H 0 . 0 20•• 0 . 025** 0 .022** 0 . 0 16** 
(8.44 ) <12 .27 ) <3 .52 l (5 . 5 1 ) ( 4 . 45 ) (6 . 15 ) 
0 . 004 0 . 003 0 . 004• -0 . 00006 - 0 . 002 - 0 . 003 
(0 . 99) <0 . 96 ) (2 . 06 > (-0 . 03) (-0 . 08 ) <-0 . 27> 
-0 . 00 1 -0.0002 -0.0007 0 . 0002 -0 . 0009 0 . 005•• 
( -1 . 43) (-0 . 38) ( -1. 75) (0.44) (-0 .1 7 ) <2 . 33 ) 
-0 . 020 -0 . 02 1 - 0.028 0 . 020 -0 . 223 0 . 3 16** 
(-0.38) (-0 . 5 1 ) (-1.19) (0 .66 ) ( -0 . 77 > ( 2.24) 
0 . 007 0 . 0 1 1 0 . 0 10 -0 . 0 15 0 . 160 -0 . 3 18* 
( 0 . 11 ) <0 .24 ) <0 . 33) (-0 . 40> <0 .46 ) ( -1 . 92 > 
- 2 . 638•• 0 . 824 -0.504 0 .216 10 . 0 57 2 . 686 
<-2 . 29 ) ( l . 0 2 ) ( - 0 . 91 ) <0 . 37 ) ( 1. 61 ) <I. 0 1 l 
2.109 2 . 662 2. 0 21 2 .503 1. 0 37 2 . 744 
0 . 96 0 .96 0 .92 0.94 0 . 90 0 . 91 
- 0 . 754** 
(-3 . 22 ) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
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